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Laying the foundation for the reestablishment of the Salt Lake City Fire Department’s 
intelligence program requires several steps: Establishing a need; identifying the 
stakeholders; developing an implementation and sustainment plan based on the key 
constructs of successful collaboration; and providing a continued mechanism for 
evaluation and adjustment. Distilling the constructs of collaboration into a key 
component of success will provide additional focus to the development and 
implementation process.  
The questions this thesis answers are, can trust be identified as a significant factor 
in successful, collaborative working relationships? And if so, how can focusing on 
developing trust add value and sustainment potential to the SLCFD intelligence gathering 
use and dissemination program? The research uses appreciative inquiry in combination 
with multiple case studies, examining elements of successful and unsuccessful 
collaborative efforts in the arena of the fire service and national security.  
This thesis investigates the rise and fall of the Salt Lake City Fire Department’s 
national security effort for the time period spanning pre-2002 Olympics to 2014. 
Components responsible for the diminished involvement since the Olympics are 
examined, evaluating each based on the role of trust. The nexus between those constructs 
and trust is the foundation for the recommendations for rebuilding the Salt Lake City Fire 
Department intelligence program. Developing strong, trusting relationships and 
addressing the concerns of all stakeholders are identified as key components in the 
successful case studies. Trust has been identified as the underpinning to the 
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In 2014 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released its second Quadrennial 
Homeland Security Review (QHSR), refining its focus within the agency’s defined 
missions. One of the notable components of the 2014 review was the focus on 
community-level engagement and public-private partnerships. According to the DHS web 
page, “This second quadrennial review reflects a more focused, collaborative 
Departmental strategy, planning and analytical capability.” The Review acknowledges 
shared responsibility in the national security effort and the value added by engaging in 
public-private partnerships while leveraging resources at the federal, state, local, tribal 
and territorial levels of government, as well.  
Contrary to that effort, however, are the growing concerns for the preservation of 
civil liberties within the realm of gathering intelligence in the name of national security. 
As the National Security Agency’s (NSA) tactics make the headlines and questions about 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’s scope of authority increase, citizens are left 
wondering if they can trust their government to operate within the confines of the law 
governing the country. The American Civil Liberties Union has also voiced considerable 
concern over the intelligence community’s tactics and secrecy in securing the country.  
These opposing perspectives are at the core of the purpose of this thesis. Finding a 
methodology to bridge the gap between those who see value in fire intelligence program 
and those who do not, requires close attention to the necessary relationships and how they 
are fostered and maintained. The question that the research answers is, could trust be 
identified as a key consideration in the development of a fire department intelligence 
program and if so, how can the constructs of trust be applied to the implementation plan 
for the Salt Lake City Fire Department? Although this work is specific to the Salt Lake 
City Fire Department’s intelligence program development, the findings relating to trust 
have value for other fire departments and intelligence agencies looking to develop long-
standing collaborative relationships. 
 xv 
Analysis of successful fire department intelligence programs, in addition to 
research and analysis of the constructs of successful collaboration, was the foundation of 
the research. Having realized success in the integrated security effort during the 2002 
Winter Olympics, an analysis of how the Salt Lake City Fire Department integrated into 
the Olympic security effort and then subsequently removed itself from the continued 
post-Olympic effort was also a source of insight into how to reintegrate.  
Salt Lake City Fire Department’s role within the national security effort is 
validated through supporting documentation from the Department of Homeland Security, 
the Department of Justice and the International Association of Fire Chiefs. The 
implementation will require partnerships with city and state administrators, city and state 
fusion centers, the Salt Lake City Police Department, citizens and civil liberties advocacy 
groups. Finding a way to garner support or, at a minimum, reduce the resistance to a fire 
service intelligence program, was accomplished through a multistep process.  
According to the article, “Firefighters’ Developing Role in Counterterrorism,” 
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Kyle Dabruzzi specifically address trust as a major factor 
in the maintenance and development of a fire intelligence program. To that point, getting 
to the root of trust in an effort to build the collaboration strategy necessary for Salt Lake 
City Fire Department’s intelligence mission to succeed, was required. 
 Research conducted by Center for Homeland Defense and Security graduate 
Chris Bertram identified key constructs of collaboration endurance specific to the 2002 
Olympics security effort during and post event. These constructs were analyzed and 
compared with previous work presented by Hocevar et al. in their article, “Inter-
Organizational Collaboration: Addressing the Challenge.” Felt need, strategic planning 
and mandated systems were identified as enablers of successful collaboration within 
Bertram’s survey results and the findings within Hocevar et al’s publication.  
Trust was also identified as a key construct in successful collaborations in both 
works. However, this research demonstrates that trust is intrinsic to all constructs 
identified as enablers of collaboration by Bertram and Hocevar. Mayer et al. Dyadic 
Organizational Trust Model was identified as the most applicable framework to address 
 xvi 
the challenges the fire intelligence mission could face. The model breaks trust down into 
four components; the trustee, or the person wanting or needing to be trusted; the trustor, 
the person who will be doing the trusting; perceived risk; and the context in which that 
risk is being taken. Qualities of the trustee that would make him or her more or less 
trustworthy, according to the Mayer et al. model, are ability, benevolence and integrity. 
Focusing on the trustee and the impact he or she has on the success of collaborative 
relationships empowers program developers to use those constructs in an effort to fortify 
the collaborative relationships that will support the success of the program.  
Based on the findings of this research, there are ten sequential steps recommended 
for the development and implementation of the Salt Lake City Fire Department 
intelligence program offered. The steps are seated in the understanding that building and 
maintaining trust must stay ever-present in the program development and implementation 
process. Inclusiveness in developing the program structure and the policies and 
procedures that will govern the program will be necessary to assure that consideration has 
been given to all perspectives.  
Ten Steps of Recommended Implementation: 
1. Initiate meetings with decision makers for each collaboration partner  
2. Establish consensus on need and degree of involvement 
3. Develop unified proposal options to secure funding 
4. Develop strategic plan based on current and potential funding 
5. Draft policies, procedures and MOUs between agencies 
6. Establish specific channels of communication for collection and dissemination 
of information 
7. Develop expectations and training program 
8. Deliver training to fire personnel  
9. Leverage existing assets 
10. Continue planning, evaluating and adjusting as needed. 
 xvii 
These recommendations are designed to provide ample opportunity for open 
dialogue throughout the development, implementation and sustainment phases of the 
program. Encouraging input from the stakeholders builds trust that the program will 
address the interests of all affected parties. Soliciting evaluation and feedback affords a 
higher probability of lasting collaboration and a successful, sustainable program, as 
changing needs are addressed and the program is allowed to stay agile.  
According to the Department of Homeland Security’s Quadrennial Review, the 
nature of the threat to homeland security is changing. Centralized threats are shifting to 
the less predictable lone wolf attacks like the Boston bombings. Radicalization within the 
western countries has become a greater concern with the developments in Syria and Iraq 
and the advancement of the Islamist State in Syria. The Department of Homeland 
Security has identified community-level engagement as a key element in securing the 
country. 
The fire service provides unique perspective and core capabilities to the effort. 
Having identified trust as the cornerstone to success in the development, implementation 
and sustainment of the Fire intelligence program model within Salt Lake City, it will be 
important to assure that all necessary steps are taken to promote inclusion, ownership and 
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A. TRUST AND FIRE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS. 
As the memory of 9/11 fades, the federal government and its agencies are being 
more thoroughly scrutinized on financial and ethical aspects of the homeland security 
effort.12 According to a recent New York Times article, the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance (FISA) Court has created dozen of classified rulings, creating laws that grant 
the National Security Agency (NSA) the power to collect a mass of data on Americans in 
the name of pursuing terrorism suspects and those potentially involved in cyber attacks, 
spying, and nuclear proliferation.3 The media coverage of this event translated to a key 
question in the public eye: can the government, in the broadest definition of the word, be 
trusted? President Obama is working to reform U.S. intelligence gathering measures at 
the national level; however, do these events have any bearing on local efforts to collect, 
share and disseminate intelligence in the name of public safety?4  
National interest in community level involvement in counterterrorism effort is 
increasing; including greater interest in the role of the fire service. As the reach of 
intelligence and national security programs expands, managing scrutiny of such programs 
continues to be an ongoing challenge. The primary goal of this thesis is to isolate trust as 
a key factor in creating a development and sustainment plan for the SLCFD intelligence 
gathering, use and dissemination program. This argument—that trust is a key factor—has 
been made before, as in an article by the Manhattan Institute that argues attention must be 
1 John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “Terror, Security and Money:Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and 
Costs of Homeland Security,” Annual Convention of the Midwst Poitical Schience Association, 2011. 
2 Chelsea J. Carter and Jessica Yellin, “CNN Read More,” ABC 4, CNN, Aug 10, 2013, 
http://www.wtae.com/news/politics/obama-wants-you-to-feel-better-about-surveillance/-
/9680976/21401140/-/3a5dw2z/-/index.html#ixzz2cTC2a8fJ. 
3 Eric Lichtblau, “In Secret, Court Vastly Broadens Powers of N.S.A.” New York Times, July 6, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/us/in-secret-court-vastly-broadens-powers-of-
nsa.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed Aug 18, 2013). 
4 Chelsea J. Carter and Jessica Yellin, ABC 4, CNN, Aug 10, 2013, By Chelsea J. Carter and Jessica 
Yellin CNN Read more: http://www.wtae.com/news/politics/obama-wants-you-to-feel-better-about-
surveillance/-/9680976/21401140/-/3a5dw2z/-/index.html#ixzz2cTC2a8fJ. 
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given to the maintenance and development of trust within the fire intelligence program.5 
This thesis will build upon this earlier work, and discuss the importance of trust in the 
context of the Salt Lake City Fire Department.   
B. DESIRED OUTCOME. 
The Fire/Intelligence relationship is a developing component of the national effort 
to improve safety and security for the citizens and responders within their communities. 
This work will build the nexus between trust, effective information sharing and 
collaborative relationships specific to the Salt Lake City Fire Department (SLCFD). The 
objectives are: to identify where the SLCFD fits into the national network; to evaluate 
and compare the SLCFD’s previous involvement in the security efforts during the 2002 
Olympics to current involvement; to assess the post-Olympic environment and its impact 
on SLCFD’s collaboration endurance; and to distill down the components of failed 
collaboration to the single element of trust. Creating a single point of failure may allow 
program developers to focus on specific methods to build and maintain trust within the 
SLCFD/IC model and advance the SLCFD’s efforts to support national information 
sharing efforts. 
C. NATIONAL EFFORT TO IMPROVE INFORMATION SHARING 
1. Broadening the Value of Intelligence 
Intelligence only has value when shared and utilized. Because of the sensitive 
nature of intelligence work in general, there is an intrinsic tendency for those who have 
access to sensitive information to want to keep it to themselves or within their agency. 
This is a questionable tactic, as large-scale, preventable events have been successfully 
executed due to a lack of communication in the past.  
The willingness of the keepers of intelligence to share what they know is reliant 
on a multitude of factors. Not knowing what others need to know, not trusting that they’ll 
do the right thing once they have it and believing that sharing it may compromise the 
5 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Kyle Dabruzzi, “Firefighters’ Developing Role in Counterterrorism,” 
Policing Terrorism Report no. 3 (New York, NY: Center for Policing Terrorism at the Manhattan Institute, 
August 2008): 1. 
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value of the intelligence, are possible explanations. No matter the driver, the need to 
share information and engage more agencies, groups and individuals in the national 
security effort has been made clear by Homeland Security leadership.67 
2. Tiers of Improved Information Sharing 
The post 9/11 environment continues to evolve and provide the United States with 
unique security challenges. In the immediate wake of the 2001 attacks on the US, 
mismanagement of intelligence, critical to disrupting the attacks, was identified as a key 
component in failing to stop them. The 9/11 Commission Report defined the problem as 
an inability to “connect the dots.”8 A lack of information sharing was pivotal in the 
successful attacks. Three tiers within the effort to improve interdepartmental 
communication can be identified within our nation. 
At a federal level, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was developed. 
The idea being that putting several of the national security agencies under one department 
would provide an intrinsic continuity to the goal of protecting the homeland. The 
secretary of Homeland Security oversees eight child agencies, with a stated goal of 
preparing for, preventing and responding to domestic emergencies to be working toward 
the basic homeland security mission.9 
The value and importance of state, local and tribal agencies was also made clear 
during post 9/11 analysis. Interagency collaboration at all levels continues to be the focus 
in addressing how domestic intelligence is gathered, disseminated and utilized. Bridging 
the gaps between federal, state, local and tribal entities has begun. Fusion centers, a 
network of information collection and analysis hubs, have provided a mechanism to more 
effectively connect the dots, as information is obtained, analyzed and disseminated to 
participating parties at all levels of government. The challenge comes in recognizing who 
6 Department of Homeland Security, 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (Washington, DC: 
The Department of Homeland Security, 2014). 
7 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004). 
8 Ibid. 
9 Department of Homeland Security, 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (Washington, DC: 
The Department of Homeland Security, 2014). 
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needs to be involved and determining who may benefit from specific intelligence. The 
increase in fire service involvement within this tier of the effort on a national level will be 
discussed later in this work and be applied to the recommendations.  
The final tier of improving information sharing is to engage citizens at the 
community level. The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review emphasized the 
importance of involving the citizen, communities, and private sector leadership in the 
homeland security effort. Law enforcement has traditionally led local intelligence efforts, 
however national interest is shifting to include fire and emergency medical personnel. 
The desired outcome of this research is to identify the optimum development and 
implementation model to best leverage the SLCFD as an intelligence asset.  
The paradigm shift toward including the fire department in the national 
intelligence effort is the impetus for this research. Within each tier there is a clear need 
for collaboration between agencies, organizations and individuals. Creating a module, 
with a high probability for success, will depend on breaking down the key elements of 
successful collaboration and reconstructing them around the challenges SLCFD may face 
in the effort. 
3. Trust as a Factor in Improved Information Sharing 
Balancing trust with the necessity to obtain, analyze and use information or 
intelligence in the name of public safety can be a challenge. In order to achieve the 
desired outcome, this research will compare the current SLCFD intelligence program to 
that of 2002, reestablish the need for a robust Fire/Intelligence program, and develop a 
plan to reinvigorate an ailing program with sound policy development. Policy drives all 
aspect of government. Trust in policy development with an emphasis on the legal, civil 
and human elements of implementation should be explored because this type of program 
affects people.  
This challenge has multiple fronts: Attention to civil liberties, privacy laws and 
ethics with regard to firefighter access into private property. The others are subtle, yet can 
play an equally important role in the success and sustainability of the program. The role 
of trust, across the necessary partnerships for the SLCFD/IC program to flourish, needs to 
 4 
be understood. There are technical components of program development, such as policies 
and procedures, memorandums of understanding and the task of managing the 
classification of intelligence materials; and there are the relationships necessary to make 
the vision come to fruition. Understanding the intricacies and value of each node and link 
within the network is critical. Assessing the cost of breaking or weakening a link due to a 
lack of credibility is also relevant. 
D. METHODS. 
“The moment there is suspicion about a person’s motives, everything he 
does becomes tainted.”  
–Mahatma Gandhi10 
Utilizing the principles of appreciative inquiry,11 an assessment of the current 
SLCFD/IC program, as compared to the 2002 Olympics time period, will identify the 
successful constructs of collaboration at work when involvement was high. This would 
include SLCFD’s participation in the preparation and management of the 2002 Olympics, 
in addition to an analysis of why the SLCFD has experienced a decrease in the overall 
participation in the security effort within its jurisdiction. The hypothesis is that trust plays 
a key role in collaboration endurance and that collaboration development and durability 
will be driven by program development recommendations made in the context of building 
trust. 
Identifying a network structure necessary to successfully leverage firefighters 
within the intelligence community brings to light the relationships that underpin the 
program. Whether personal or professional, when human relationships are formed, the 
outcome of that interaction is dependent on many factors. This work will explore the 
potential impact and value of trust between stakeholders, the implementation and 
sustainment of a fire service intelligence program.  
10 Quote found in Stephen M.R. Covey, The Speed of Trust, The One Thing That Changes Everything 
(New York, NY: Free Press, 2006). 8. 
11 Appreciative inquiry is an analysis perspective that focuses on further developing components of a 
system that are working favorably.  
 5 
                                                 
The hypothesis is that there is value in identifying all of the necessary 
relationships and focusing on developing trust between the working groups during the 
program development, implementation and sustainment phases in order to attain the 
desired outcome. This work will review reports and documentation evaluating the 
collaborative security efforts during the 2002 Winter Olympics, Chris Bertram’s analysis 
of the enablers of collaboration endurance during and post Olympics, identify a 
framework for developing trust, and use existing models for minimizing vulnerability in 
program development and implementation. The development of the alternative solutions 
and the criteria used to develop policy supporting the desired outcome, i.e. successful 
integration of the fire service into the IC, will be based on Bertram’s findings and the 
analysis of those findings against the constructs of trust. Potential hurdles will be 
identified and trust-building opportunities from successful models that could potentially 
be utilized to overcome those hurdles will be evaluated.  
The research will rely on a combination of literature and data from like programs 
that will be identified as collaboration dependent and assessed for relevance to the Salt 
Lake City Fire/intelligence community program (SLCFD/IC). Using summative 
evaluation, the outcomes and the bearing of efforts to foster trust and transparency within 
the examples, in addition to comparing similarities and differences to the cases and policy 
development in the SLCFD/IC, will either validate or dismiss the evaluation’s relevance. 
A case study of the SLCFD intelligence program, both past and present, will be 
utilized in two ways: First to determine if the Fire/Intelligence program in Salt Lake City 
would add value to the community; and second, to analyze Salt Lake City itself, and the 
rise and fall of the fire department’s involvement in the national security effort (and how 
the strength of this partnering arrangement might affect SLC). Study into the principles of 
social science and how they relate to successful collaboration within the Fire/Intelligence 
model will also be evaluated. 
 
Questions that will need to be answered: 
1. Is there national support for fire service involvement in the intelligence 
efforts? 
2. What evidence is available to support that SLCFD was an integral part of the 
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security efforts during the 2002 Olympics? 
3. What are the indicators that the SLCFD involvement has changed? 
4. What are the factors that led to the successful Olympics security framework?  
5. What agencies would be necessary for a successful SLCFD intelligence model 
today? 
6. Does trust play a role in successful collaborative security efforts and if so, 
how?  
7. What model can be used to measure the value of trust within a collaborative 
model’s development? 
8. Are there specific strategies and/or tactics that can foster trust within the realm 
of the SLCFD intelligence program development? 
This methodology supports the desired outcome of this research. The findings will 
direct the development and sustainment model for the integration of the Salt Lake City 
Fire Department into the IC. Trust, as a consideration for and solution to potential 
derailments in development and implementation of the SLCFD Intelligence program, will 
direct efforts toward relationships. By evaluating the successes and failures of other 
program and policy development models, policy makers for the SLCFD will have a more 
informed direction and understanding of the dynamics of entering into the IC. Potential 
hurdles will be identified and concepts in developing trust will be presented in the 
recommendations of this thesis. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Thesis Question 
Can trust be identified as a significant factor in successful, collaborative working 
relationships and if so, how can focusing on developing trust add value and sustainment 
potential to the SLCFD intelligence gathering, use and dissemination program? 
2. Purpose 
The purpose of this literature review is to examine not only the published 
information on the specific subject matter of fire service (Fire) involvement in the 
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national security effort, but to examine the content of other literature which, although not 
specific to the mission, could be relevant to answering the thesis question. The desired 
outcome is to identify the value of trust-driven program development, implementation 
and sustainment and develop a strategy based on the findings. The goal of this thesis is to 
add a deeper understanding of the relationship between trust and successful policy 
development and implementation using the fire/intelligence apparatus partnership as a 
model. 
3. Introduction 
The concept of incorporating Fire and/or emergency medical services into the 
network of intelligence gathering, use and dissemination has been identified as an area 
previously overlooked, yet valuable in the counterterrorism, intelligence and all-hazards 
approach to homeland security. The model of integrating the emergency services with the 
fusion effort has been widely accepted and promoted at an administrative level since the 
events of September 11, 2001. While some have suggested it would be negligent to do 
anything short of integrating Fire into the intelligence network,12 the model has been met 
with some concern and opposition by civil liberty groups and within various tiers of the 
organizations involved.13  
The documents supporting fire service involvement in the fusion process include 
popular, scholarly and professional literature. The opinions for or against the relationship 
seem to be directly correlated with specific advocacy interests of the source of the 
materials. The most prolific source of opposing literature has come from civil liberties 
advocacy groups like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and its affiliated 
organizations. Interestingly, the disapproval of the ACLU is expressed across the board 
on the topic of fusion centers in general, and is not specific to fire department 
involvement.14  
12 Bryon Heirston, Terrorism Prevention and Firefighting: Where are the Information-sharing 
Boundaries (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009). 
13 American Civil Liberties Union, “More About Fusion Centers,” ACLU.org, 2013, 
http://www.aclu.org/spy-files/more-about-fusion-centers (accessed July 10, 2013). 
14 Ibid. 
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Professional publications in favor of the partnership have been produced by 
government agencies like the DHS and fire service leadership organizations such as the 
International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC).15 Examples of more scholarly 
contributions would be Dabruzzi and Garenstien’s work for the Manhattan Institute for 
Policy Research,16 FDNY Battalion Chief Joseph Pfeifer’s writings, including Network 
Fusion: Information and Intelligence Sharing for a Networked World17 and several theses 
that have been submitted at the Naval Postgraduate School and the National Fire 
Academy’s Executive Fire Officer Program.  
As organizations like the DHS galvanize support for the fire service/fusion center 
partnership by creating documents like the Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers, 
which defines not only why, but how the fire service could be leveraged in the field of 
homeland security,18 leadership organizations within the fire service have also embraced 
further development of the firefighter’s role in intelligence fusion. An example would be 
the International Association of Fire Chief’s publication, Homeland Security: Intelligence 
Guide for Fire Chiefs. Both documents provide road map-style direction on building and 
leveraging the program. Several pioneering agencies have also led the way on integrating 
Fire into fusion operations and have provided written professional works to assist other 
agencies in the process in doing so. Salt Lake City, the Fire Department of New York 
City and Orange County Sheriff’s office in California are three examples.19  
15 International Association of Fire Chiefs, “IAFC Terrorism and Homelands Security Committee,” 
International Association of Fire Chiefs, 2012, 
http://www.iafc.org/committees/content.cfm?itemnumber=4648&navitemnumber=4439 (accessed June 26, 
2013). 
16 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Kyle Dabruzzi, “Firefighters’ Developing Role in Counterterrorism,” 
Policing Terrorism Report no. 3 (New York, NY: Center for Policing Terrorism at the Manhattan Institute, 
August 2008): 1. 
17 Joseph Pfeifer, “Network Fusion: Information and Intelligence Sharing for a Networked World,” 
HSAJ.ORG, HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, 2012 October, http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=8.1.17 
(accessed 2013 8-July). 
18 Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice, Fire Service Integration for 
Fusion Centers (Washington, DC: DHS & DOJ, 2012). 
19 FDNY, FDNY Counter Terrorism and Risk Management Strategy (NY: FDNY, 2011). 
Orange County Sheriff’s Department, Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center, 2013, 
http://ocsd.org/divisions/fieldops/security/iac (accessed June 25, 2013). 
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As an emerging concept, assessing trust within the Fire intelligence model is still 
relatively new and specific literature on the topic is sparse. When considering how trust 
impacts the process and how to foster trust at all tiers of the network, writing specifically 
on that issue is lean. Up to now the focus has been procedurally driven. There are two 
exceptions; the first is a thesis written by CHDS student Chris Bertram. His work will be 
used to evaluate what role trust played specifically in the collaboration necessary to 
manage a successful and safe Olympics in 2002. He also discusses the maintenance 
aspect of the security community in Salt Lake City, post-Olympics. Although his focus is 
on law enforcement, his work reveals relevant information on how and why the SLCFD’s 
involvement in the IC diminished since 2002. The second exception, also law 
enforcement centric, is the Guidance for Building Communities of Trust report, written 
by Robert Wasserman. Wasserman’s work was funded by grant money from the Bureau 
of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs and the U.S. Department of Justice. His 
work provides relevant insights to the task of developing community trust within the 
scope of intelligence gathering, use and dissemination programs at the community 
level.20  
Ample literature exists on the concept of collaboration and trust. Within the arena 
of homeland security, Caudle, Hocevar, Jansen and Thomas’s work on the topic of 
collaboration is often cited. Comparisons between these works and Bertram’s findings 
will be discussed later in this document. 
4. Content 
a. Making the Case for the Fire Intelligence Program 
The fusion/Fire literature reveals three commonalities within the discussions of 
fire service integration into the fusion center functions: justification, concerns and 
mechanics. The variations within these common frameworks, focused on program 
development, are minimal among advocates of Fire involvement in intelligence 
gathering, use and dissemination. Advocates and critics alike agree that great care and 
20 Robert Wasserman, Guidance for Building Communities of Trust (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2010). 
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attention must be given to privacy, civil liberties and any other legal concerns associated 
with this type of a shift in job expectations for fire personnel.21 
Justifications for why fire service entities are well suited to participate in the IC 
consistently refer to the core competencies of fire departments in this country. An 
example would be work by Dabruzzi et al. Additionally, government publications such as 
the Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers,22 popular and scholarly works by 
Pfiefer23 and Rice24 that are cited in favor of a fire/intelligence program, present 
consistent arguments. There is clear understanding that the sheer number of firefighters 
either volunteering or working full-time within the three primary roles of the fire service 
– prevention, protection and response – could be leveraged to further the IC mission. 
How the firefighter’s warrantless access is viewed varies between negative and positive, 
again, depending on who’s making the assessment. Those who promote the idea of more 
fire involvement in the intelligence effort see the access as an opportunity; others with 
civil liberty and privacy concerns see it as a recipe for disaster and another means for the 
government to spy on average citizens.25  
Mike German, former FBI agent and senior policy counsel at the ACLU’s 
Washington Legislative Office, stated in an article regarding the FBI’s efforts in 
gathering intelligence, “Rather than aiding its terrorism prevention efforts, the FBI’s 
expanded investigative and intelligence powers have overwhelmed agents with a flood of 
irrelevant information and false alarms.”26 He cites the recent NSA security leaks by 
Richard Snowden as a revelation into the secret interpretation of the laws governing 
21 The Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age, Privacy and Civil 
Liberties (New York: Markle Foundation, 2009). 
22 Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice, Fire Service Integration for 
Fusion Centers (Washington, DC: DHS & DOJ, 2012). 
23 Joseph Pfeifer, “Network Fusion: Information and Intelligence Sharing for a Networked World,” 
Homeland Security Affairs Journal (Naval Postgraduate School) 8, no. 17 (October 2012). 
24 Lewis Rice, “Raising the Alarm,” Harvard Kennedy School Magazine (Summer 2010). Add link 
25 American Civil Liberties Union, “More About Fusion Centers,” ACLU.org, 2013, 
http://www.aclu.org/spy-files/more-about-fusion-centers (accessed 2013 йил 10-July). 
26 Mike German, “National Security, Washington Post,” Washington Post, September16, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/aclu-calls-on-obama-congress-to-rein-in-power-
of-the-fbi/2013/09/16/64481b6e-1bf1-11e3-8685-5021e0c41964_story.html (accessed September16, 2013). 
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domestic surveillance. Firefighters would be walking a fine line when filling their role 
within the intelligence effort, which most of the supporting literature acknowledges. 
Admittedly, the leaks have changed the landscape for introducing new intelligence 
gathering programs and will require extra care in policy development, management and 
accountability for the program.  
Firefighter reluctance in fusion center-related activities is widely discussed, but 
poorly documented, representing a gap in the research. Anecdotal accounts of 
firefighters’ unwillingness to participate in a role perceived as belonging to law 
enforcement has not been substantiated with statistics; however, to those in the service 
the idea is believable and needs consideration when an intelligence program is being 
developed and introduced. The concerns that typically arise from Fire relate specifically 
to the legal aspects of civil liberties adherence and the vulnerability of social capital, 
which is integral to successful execution of daily operations for emergency services. 
Ronald Burt, a professor at Chicago University, defines social capital as a metaphor 
about advantage.27 He cites Putnam’s definition: “Social capital here refers to features of 
social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of 
society by facilitating coordinated action.”28  
Law enforcement could resist the idea as well, due to an attitude, whether valid or 
not, that Fire is less competent when it comes to managing sensitive law enforcement 
information. According to Wasserman’s report on community policing, “Law 
enforcement agencies can be unwilling to share information with other agencies because 
they want to keep control of what enforcement actions are taken.”29 This pushback, 
although more subtle than the protests of the ACLU, will be critical when a strategy for 
developing trust and adding value to the program are considered. 
27 Ronald S. Burt, “Structural Holes versus Network Closure as Social Captial,” Chicagobooth, 2001, 
faculty.chicagobooth.edu/ronald.burt/research/files/SHNC.pdf (accessed July 10, 2013). 
28 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). 
29 Robert Wasserman, Guidance for Building Communities of Trust (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2010). 16 
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Literature like the DHS and DOJ’s Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers30 
and FDNY’s Counter Terrorism and Risk Management Strategy31 discuss variations in 
the mechanics of creating an intelligence program involving the fire service and are in 
favor of the effort. The challenges facing the fire service today, such as the hazards of 
chemical, biological, explosive, radiological and nuclear threats in the response 
environment are compounded by the fierce competition for dwindling funds. Many 
options are provided throughout the literature to allow adaptation to municipal needs and 
variable budgets. Gaining political buy-in with the hopes of garnering financial support 
needs development. Included in the analysis will be documentation on how other 
programs add value to the community and the other nodes within the IC network. 
Documentation describing Great Britain’s Contest program is also relevant in increasing 
trust and public value in the Fire/intelligence model. A comparison of the Contest 
program with the current IC program in Salt Lake City in an effort to discover 
opportunities for implementation will also be analyzed.  
b. Trust as it Relates to a Fire Service Intelligence Program 
The available literature on the topic of fire service involvement in the intelligence 
effort is primarily focused on why it is a good idea and how it can be accomplished 
logistically. Pfiefer touches on the idea of trust and the intrinsic value of leadership, 
relationships and accountability. Given the gravity of the task at hand, a greater emphasis 
on the leadership skills it takes to manage change and develop trust between all parties 
involved or impacted by the process is essential. This includes but is not limited to 
relationships between agencies, administrations and labor, the fusion centers and those 
protecting the rights and civil liberties of the U.S. citizens.  
According to the Government Accountability Office, “The federal government 
faces a series of challenges in the 21st century that will be difficult, if not impossible, for 
30 Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice, Fire Service Integration for 
Fusion Centers (Washington, DC: DHS & DOJ, 2012). 
31 FDNY, FDNY Counter Terrorism and Risk Management Strategy (NY: FDNY, 2011). 
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any single agency to address alone.”32 Collaboration will be paramount. As finances 
become scarce, trust wanes in government policy and scrutiny of domestic intelligence 
efforts and programs continues, judicious planning for program development and policy 
implementation is critical.  
Acknowledging the connection between policy and the impact it has on 
individuals, groups or society as a whole is at the core of trust-driven program 
development. Recognizing the nexus policy formation and operational implementation 
and the resulting impact on the people will allow us to examine the role of trust in the 
development of policy for fire department intelligence gathering, use and dissemination. 
Enablers of collaboration and trust can be leveraged in program development, 
implementation and sustainment effort.  
Drivers of collaboration have been examined in works by Caudle on high 
performance partnerships,33 Hocevar et al. on the specific factors that create successful 
collaboration, and Bertram and the specific relationship collaboration had to the 
Olympics security effort in 2002.34 Chief J. Pfeifer from FDNY should also be 
recognized for his insight on responsibility, accountability and the need to acknowledge 
and strategize on combating competition among team members and channel energy and 
focus on the common purpose.35 
“Collaboration success factors” identified by the work of Hocevar et al. were the 
foundation of a study conducted by Bertram, which focused specifically on security 
efforts before, during and after the 2002 Olympics.3637 Interviewing twenty-two law 
32 Government Accountability Office, Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration 
Among Federal Agencies (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2005). link 
33 Sharon Caudle, “Basic Practices Aiding High-Performance Homeland Security Regional 
Partnerships,” Homeland Security Affairs 2, no. 3 (October 2006). Add link 
34 Christopher Bertram, Factors the Effect Interagency Collaborations: Lessons During and Following 
the 2002 Winter Olympics (master’s Thesis Naval Postgraduate School, 2008). Add link 
35 Joseph Pfeifer, “Network Fusion: Information and Intelligence Sharing for a Networked World,” 
Homeland Security Affairs 8, no. 17 (October 2012). link 
36 Sharon Caudle, “Basic Practices Aiding High-Performance Homeland Security Regional 
Partnerships,” Homeland Security Affairs 2, no. 3 (October 2006). 
37 Susan Page Hocevar, Erik Jansen and Gail Fann Thomas, “Inter-Organizational Collaboration: 
Addressing the Challenge,” Homeland Security Affairs 7, The 9/11 Essays (September 2011). link 
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enforcement leaders who had been involved in the Olympics security effort, Bertram 
identified enablers or facilitators of collaboration development and endurance. There 
were significant similarities between Bertram’s finds and the constructs of successful 
collaboration identified in the work of Hocevar et al. Betram’s key concepts; social 
capital, felt need, leadership and mandated systems, provided a platform for further 
research into how trust impacted each construct within his collaboration endurance 
model.  
Research was required to address several different opportunities for trust to have a 
positive or negative impact on the success of the program. The concerns identified 
earlier, civil liberties and agency resistance, are relevant to the essential organizations or 
agencies identified within the Fire/Intelligence mission network. Finding tools to foster 
trust in the program, in an effort to ease the concerns, required looking into 
organizational tactics in trust development outside the Fire/Intelligence mission arena. 
Linsky and Heifetz speak to the concept of “confronting the gaps between our 
values and behavior.”38 Linsky and Heifetz point out the challenge of confronting the 
gaps between values and behavior, which applies to both individuals and organizations.39 
The struggle is a continuum and requires strong leadership to manage the mission and the 
multitude of personalities critical to success. The gaps that form between values and 
behaviors are key in defining integrity as individuals and organizations. What rests in 
those gaps are opportunities to tarnish and betray trust.40  
Mark H. Moore developed the idea of adding public value in policy 
development.41 The ideas he presents are helpful in building the foundation of public 
trust. He talks about “value as stakeholder and customer satisfaction,” which broadens the 
perspective of program development. Considering the “stakeholder” means a more 
inclusive mechanism of program development. Moore places a high level of importance 
38 Ronald A Heifetz and Lindsky Marty, Leadership on the Line (Boston: Harvard Business Review 
Press, 2002). 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ronald A. Heifetz and Marty Linsky, Leadership on the Line (2002). 
41 Mark H. Moore, “Public Value as the Focus of Strategy,” Australian Journal of Public 
Administration 53, no. 3 (1994): 297. 
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on the satisfaction of citizens, as “their goals are the only things that justify the 
expenditure of public resources.”42  
Moore’s assertions are reiterated in community intelligence-specific terms in 
Wasserman’s report. Wasserman addresses the overall concept of Building Communities 
of Trust (BCOT).43 The content of his report supports the development of added public 
value, in addition to supporting the concepts of Britain’s Contest program.  
c. Leveraging Existing Models for Trust 
The efficiency of trust is the primary assertion of Stephen Covey in The Speed of 
Trust.44 The concept is developed within the personal and professional context within 
Covey’s work. In an effort to minimize setbacks and optimize time and resources, the 
concepts within The Speed of Trust emphasize and reinforce the examples and 
frameworks specifically used to develop the recommendations within this thesis.  
Arbinger Institute’s work on personal and organization relationships brings clarity 
to the destructive concepts of collusion and self-deception, which work to erode trust and 
influence.45 This group has successfully distilled centuries of philosophy, psychology 
and sociology into clear, straightforward and applicable concepts in collaboration. 
Arbinger’s model and framework lends practical support to the concept of developing 
trust and strengthening collaboration.  
The dyadic model of organizational trust completed by Mayer, Davis and 
Schoorman provides a dynamic framework and a multifaceted perspective of the 
constructs of trust.46 What makes this model unique from earlier conceptualizations of 
trust is the differentiation between trust and trustworthiness, and the inclusion of 
42 Ibid. 301. 
43 Robert Wasserman, Guidance for Building Communities of Trust (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2010). 16 
44 Stephen R Covey, The Speed of Trust, The One Thing That Changes Everything (New York: Free 
Press, 2006). 
45 The Arbinger Institute, Leadership and Self Deception (San Francisco: Berett-Koehler Publishers. 
2010). 
46 Roger C. Mayer, James H. Davis and F. David Schoorman, “An Integrative Model of 
Organizational Trust,” The Academy of Management Review 20, no. 3 (July 1995): 711. 
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vulnerability and context in the formulation of trust. Three antecedents of trust within the 
construct of trustworthiness; ability, benevolence and integrity, are identified within the 
Mayer et al. model. This breakdown of trustworthiness defines a variable within the 
model, which is dependent on the character and competency of the trustee, the person 
seeking to be trusted.  
Consideration for the personality traits of the trustor, the individual doing the 
trusting within a relationship, recognizes the variability of that individual’s propensity to 
trust. The Mayer et al. model creates a dynamic interdependence between the constructs 
they’ve identified. This dynamic equates to opportunity when seeking mechanisms to 
facilitate trust and consequently build stronger, more lasting collaboration.  
The key commonality among these works is the understanding that human 
behavior conforms to norms, with little variation. People are prone to agency bias, have 
expectations of how they should be treated, and oftentimes fail to reciprocate the very 
treatment they’d like to experience at the hands of others. This thesis will explore the 
value and mechanics of developing a fire service intelligence model through the available 
literature, as well as key ways to minimize the resistance to the idea by utilizing 
principles, concepts and lessons learned in other policy development and implementation 
scenarios.  
5. Conclusion 
As the homeland security effort develops at the community level, the debate over 
how much is too much continues. While some literature supports the idea that fire and 
emergency services are untapped resources, others express reluctance to the idea of 
trusted first responders collecting intelligence on the customers they serve. Even within 
the service-level agencies, differing opinions exist on what, if any, role Fire should or 
could play in the IC effort. 
Although how Fire fits into program implementation varies, documentation from 
organizations like the DHS, IAFC, and those already incorporating Fire into their 
community intelligence efforts, is unanimous in support. The arguments in favor of Fire’s 
greater involvement stem from citing the sheer number of firefighters as a resource to the 
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natural fit of the skill sets those in the emergency services embody with the homeland 
security effort. 
Concerns are still prevalent within the civil liberties organizations, law 
enforcement and the fire service itself. The documentation questioning the practice 
focuses on trust and value. Bertram’s work on trust within the IC during the Olympics in 
2002 will provide insight into the role of trust and interagency collaboration. The data he 
collected demonstrates the relevance of trust in the IC and will be factored into the 
recommendations of this work. 
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II. THE FIRE SERVICE ROLE WITHIN THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY EFFORT 
Examining the Department of Homeland Security’s 2014 Quadrennial Report, it 
is clear the nation is working hard to stay ahead of security threats. Local, state and tribal 
resources are being recruited to broaden the reach of protecting our country. As 
additional security assets are called upon to participate in the effort, it is important to 
clearly define roles and expectations.  
 
A. MAKING THE CASE FOR FIRE DEPARTMENT PARTICIPATION 
In order to promote a paradigm shift the magnitude of asking firefighters to 
engage in intelligence and security activities, the value added needs to be well 
substantiated. Revealing the threat posed, the vulnerability of the community served and 
the tools at the disposal of the fire service to mitigate potential harm will be significant 
aspects of promoting the fire department intelligence program. Building trust in the basis 
of the program will involve assuring all stakeholders see the need and want to be a party 
to its success.  
1. Our Changing World 
As our national security challenges change from a centralized threat like Al 
Qaida, to more of a decentralized, lone wolf model, like the Boston Marathon bombing, 
creativity in how we provide for the safety, security and resiliency of our nation must be 
encouraged.47 Concern is growing over the strength, funding and global recruitment 
efforts of the Islamist State in Syria (ISIS). Suspicions that western militants trained and 
fighting in Syria will return home to their western regions have been confirmed. 
According to an NBC report, as of June 2014, “In the past 18 months, British authorities 
47 Department of Homeland Security, 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, Government 
(Washington, DC: The Department of Homeland Security, 2014). 
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have arrested 65 people returning from Syria…48 Michael Leiter, NBC News’ counter-
terrorism and national security analyst, is quoted as saying, “For the United States and 
Western Europe, this is a very significant threat—probably as significant and complex a 
threat as we have faced since 9/11.”49 These trends validate increasing community-level 
security and resiliency efforts.  
2. Community Need – Applicability in SLC 
Determining if developing a Fire intelligence program within Salt Lake City or 
the State of Utah would be prudent and add public value to the citizens is a critical 
component in determining how to proceed. Salt Lake City has several unique homeland 
security challenges. There is significant infrastructure target potential with our joint civil-
military international airport, a major railway hub for freight, Amtrak and local commuter 
lines, a nuclear reactor and more than 800 hazardous materials storage or use facilities 
within city boundaries.50 
According to the Utah Department of Natural Resources, The State of Utah is 
ranked 11th in the country in crude oil production and 9th in natural gas gross production 
(Energy Information Administration; rankings based on 2011 oil production and 2011 
natural gas production, not including Federal Offshore production areas). There are 
approximately 11,000 wells currently in production within the state.51 Facilities that 
support the extraction of oil and gas include five oil refineries and a complex rail and 
pipeline system could also be vulnerable to eco-terrorism. Although the eco-terrorism 
activity in the U.S. has decreased, the FBI continues to express significant concern with 
48 Michele Neubert, Alastair Jamieson and Sarah Burke, “NBC News Storyline, Iraq Turmoil,” NBC 
News, June 29, 2014, www.nbcnews.com/storyline/iraq-turmoil/rise-isis-heightens-threat-terrorism-west-
experts-warn-n141661 (accessed August 23, 2014). 
49 Ibid. 
50 Salt Lake City Fire Prevention Bureau, SLCFPB.com, 2013, 
http://www.slcfpb.com/go/doc/3687/1334907/ (accessed July 9, 2013). 
51 Utah Department of Natural Resources, Utah Oil and Gas, 2013, 
http://oilgas.ogm.utah.gov/index.htm (accessed July 10, 2013). 
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the potential resurgence.52 These types of attacks have also taken place repeatedly in 
Canada. In 1990 the pipelines were attacked in the Peace River region in Alberta and in 
October 2008, EnCana sour gas pipelines were sabotaged by anonymous individuals.53 
Although the frequency of such attacks has diminished, consideration for protecting 
against them needs to remain, according to the FBI.54  
The predominant religious sect that is central to Utah, the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints (LDS), could create target potential, as well. In 2009, the Heritage 
Foundation reported that since the Mormon Church’s support for California Proposition 8 
was made public in 2008, “Mormons were particularly and systematically targeted for 
supporting prop 8.”55 The centralized structure of the LDS headquarters, the Conference 
Center, Temple Square and the Church History Library in the heart of downtown Salt 
Lake City, also adds to the vulnerability of the LDS sites. 
Since 1991 the Salt Lake Valley has experienced five active shooter incidents in 
public areas, four within Salt Lake City proper in the past 14 years. One of those 
incidents occurred inside the LDS Genealogy Library.5657 Recent threats from the 
Animal Liberation Front (ALF) have named Utah as a key target for mink farm attacks as 
52 Juliet Eilperin, “The Washington Post Health and Science,” Washington Post, March 10, 2012, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/as-eco-terrorism-wanes-governments-still-target-
activist-groups-seen-as-threat/2012/02/28/gIQAA4Ay3R_story.html (accessed August 20, 2014). 
53 Katerina Bondarchuk, “Hear Us Out: Radical Activism or “Eco-Terrorism” in Canada,” 
Academia.edu, April 2011, http://www.academia.edu/6415201/_Hear_Us_Out_Radical_Activism_or_Eco-
Terrorism_in_Canada (accessed August 20, 2014). 
54 Juliet Eilperin, “The Washington Post Health and Science,” The Washington Post, March 10, 2012, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/as-eco-terrorism-wanes-governments-still-target-
activist-groups-seen-as-threat/2012/02/28/gIQAA4Ay3R_story.html (accessed August 20, 2014). 
55 Thomas M Messner, “The Heritage Foundation research reports,” Heritage.Org, October 22, 2009, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/10/the-price-of-prop-8 (accessed August 23, 2014). 
56 KSL News Agency, KSL.com, Feb 13, 2007, http://www.ksl.com/?nid=148&sid=888784 (accessed 
July 8, 2013). 
57 Wendy Ogata, KSL.com, February 13, 2007, 
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/660195182/Infamous-shooting-incidents-in-Salt-Lake-
County.html?pg=all (accessed July 8, 2013). 
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well.58 Utah is familiar with ALF activity as the group was responsible for the 1995 fire 
at Tandy Leather store in Salt Lake City.59  
The area’s potential vulnerabilities measured against recent history provide a 
compelling argument for more robust law enforcement and fire department relationships. 
Two of the five HLS mission statements contained within the 2014 Quadrennial 
Homeland Security Review, Prevention and Strengthening National Preparedness and 
Resilience, are national goals that have local significance.60 The strategy of engaging 
communities throughout the country is recognized at the federal level as a plausible way 
to counter terrorism’s impact on our nation. First responders are being enlisted to identify 
warning signs of local terrorist involvement, radicalization or preparation for a domestic 
attack as they perform their regular duties. As this expanded role of fire departments 
becomes more widely accepted among the national security partners, it is time to identify 
the best course of action to reintegrate the SLCFD into local, state and federal 
intelligence networks. 
3. An Expansion in the Fire Service Model  
The fire service has traditionally served a specific role within its respective 
communities. Throughout the evolution of the fire service, particular skill sets have been 
developed, broadening the value of the departments to the community. An example 
would be when the fire service began providing emergency medical response in addition 
to fire suppression in the 1960s.61 This represented a significant service model change 
and was met with considerable resistance; however, today, on a national level, nearly 70 
58 Roxeanne Vainuku, KUTV.com, June 18, 2013, http://www.kutv.com/news/top-
stories/stories/vid_5368.shtml (accessed July 9, 2013). 
59 Southern Poverty Law Center, SPLC Southern Poverty Law Center, Fall 2002, 
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2002/fall/from-push-to-
shove/eco-violence-the-rec. 
60 Department of Homeland Security, 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (Washington, 
DC: The Department of Homeland Security, 2014). 
61 Franklin D. Pratt, Paul E. Pepe, Steven Katz and David Persse, “Prehospital 9–1-1 Emergency 
Medical Response: The rold of the United States Fire Serice in Delivery and Coordination,” www.iaff.org, 
International Association of Fire Fighters, July 2007, https://www.iaff.org/tech/PDF/FB%20EMS 
%20Whitepaper%20FINAL%20July%205%202007%20.pdf (accessed August 23, 2014). 5. 
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percent of calls the fire service responds to are medical in nature.62 The forward-thinking 
paradigm shift enhanced the usefulness of the fire service to the communities it serves 
and further solidified the municipal fire service model.  
Members of the fire service have a multitude of resources and abilities that could 
serve the nation’s security efforts well. The primary objective of this chapter is to explore 
the national trends, assess the applicability of the fire service within the national security 
effort and evaluate Salt Lake City’s previous involvement in security efforts during and 
after the 2002 Olympics.  
a. Tools and Core Capabilities Supporting the Fire Intelligence Program 
Emergency responders are an abundant resource, with access to people and places 
that others may not have through emergency response, arson investigation and business 
inspections. According to the National Fire Protection Association there were a total of 
1,100,450 firefighters in the United States in 2012; 344,050 were career firefighters and 
756,400 were volunteers.63 The role of the firefighter integrates well into the needs of the 
national intelligence network effort. The core competencies of firefighting provide 
several avenues of program implementation, diversifying the opportunities for using and 
collecting actionable intelligence. Through training and experience, firefighters develop a 
knowledge base in situational awareness, fire behavior and suppression, emergency 
medicine, fire code, rescue, hazardous materials, fire investigation, scene safety, fire 
protection systems and building construction. Fire service personnel have analytical skills 
and subject matter expertise (SME), ideal for contributing to intelligence analysis, 
production and use.64 According to a Gartenstein-Ross and Dabruzzi article from the 
Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, “There are three broad ways in which fire 
departments can contribute to counterterrorism efforts; as intelligence collectors, users 
62 Jennifer D. Flynn, Fire Service Perfomance Measures, Statistical, Fire Analysis and REsearch 
Division, National Fire Protection Association (Quincy: NFPA, 2009), 8. 
63 National Fire Protection Association, National Fire Protection Association, 2012, 
http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=955&itemID=23688&cookie_test=1 (accessed June 22, 
2013). 
64 Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice, Fire Service Integration for 
Fusion Centers (Washington, DC: DHS & DOJ, 2012) 3. 
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and sharers; as developers of community networks; and as organizers of joint planning, 
preparedness, and response.”65 These are integral roles in Homeland Security that could 
be missed if a thoughtful plan is not developed, implemented and evaluated within Salt 
Lake City. Analyzing the current application of these functions more closely will 
demonstrate that Salt Lake City Fire is actively involved in the use of intelligence in a 
different but relevant application. 
b. Fire Service Functions Well-Suited for Security Effort 
Comparing Gartenstein-Ross and Dabruzzi’s description of the firefighter’s 
counterterrorism role to current activities performed on the SLCFD, reveals several 
opportunities that could be leveraged into an IC model. Offered are a few examples of 
existing programs that, by nature, could be utilized to broaden the scope of the Fire 
Department’s involvement in the overall security measures within the community. 
Because these programs are already in place or skill sets have already been developed, 
the expansion into the IC would not require a great deal of effort. 
(1) Intelligence Collectors, Users and Sharers 
Every member of the SLCFD is trained to make observations in a broad array of 
applications. Fire and medical events, accident scenes and occupancies under inspection 
provide ample opportunity to assess an area for cause, event reconstruction and 
suspicious activity. Some examples are the cause and origin of a fire; the mechanism of 
injury for motor vehicle accidents; and evidence of illegal drugs present at the scene of an 
unconscious patient. Specific training relating to observed activities associated with 
criminal or terrorist activity may help prompt a different reaction to items once 
overlooked as nonconsequential. What must be clear is that the end objective of 
heightened awareness is a goal, not an enforceable mandate.66 The hope is to broaden the 
scope of knowledge so things that may not have seemed strange or out of place before 
can be perceived as potentially relevant. According to the Nationwide SAR Initiative 
65 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Kyle Dabruzzi, “Firefighters’ Developing Role in Counterterrorism,” 
Policing Terrorism Report no. 3 (New York, NY: Center for Policing Terrorism at the Manhattan Institute, 
August 2008): 1. 
66 Ibid. 2. 
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training for firefighters, “suspicious activity reporting focuses on behaviours and 
incidents, not race, ethnicity, national origin or religious affiliations.”67 Maintaining this 
focus will build credibility with the public as well as the firefighters engaged in the 
program.  
(2) Developers of Community Networks 
One example of how SLCFD builds networks within the city is through the work 
of Salt Lake City’s Fire Prevention Bureau (SLCFPB). The primary function of the 
SLCFPB is to connect with the general public, business owners and contractors in order 
to provide useful information on various safety procedures and practices. This division is 
in constant contact with the community through permit and business inspections, school 
programs, Fire Prevention Week activities, community council participation and 
partnering with private sector entities for community safety events.68 Inspectors spend 
their days entering into every newly constructed building in the city and those that have 
been involved in moderate to significant renovation. Longstanding relationships are 
developed as each inspector works within a specific specialty.  
An example would be the law enforcement officer (LEO) fire inspectors and the 
high life safety occupancy program. Entertainment venue operators work closely with the 
LEO inspectors to assure the safety of their patrons. Through this program, the LEO 
inspectors build strong working relationships with bar managers and owners. Developing 
networks among the nightclub management has led to information sharing about illegal 
or suspicious activity within their businesses and illegal parties and venue use.69 LEO 
fire inspectors are also diligent in collecting intelligence and acting on leads, in addition 
to patrolling high life safety occupancies. Gathering intelligence through Internet 
advertisements to break up illegal rave parties is one example. 
67 Nationwide SAR Initiative, National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center, 2012, 
http://nsi.ncirc.gov/training_online.aspx (accessed July 9, 2013). 
68 Salt Lake City Fire Prevention Bureau, SLCFPB.com, 2013, 
http://www.slcfpb.com/go/doc/3687/1334907/ (accessed July 9, 2013). 
69 Ibid. 
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Within the department, the SLCFPB is key to providing valuable intelligence to 
the Operations Branch of the fire department. One example of this is through the 
hazardous materials permitting and inspection program. Inspectors perform over 800 
hazardous materials inspections annually. Through the department records management 
system (RMS) chemical type, quantities and location are recorded and integrated into the 
computer aided dispatch system (CAD). Not only is the information at the fingertips of 
the operations crews when preplanning the district, dispatchers can feed pertinent 
information to the crews when en route to a reported incident.  
An extension of the SLCFPB is the exsisting business license inspection program, 
which is conducted by the operations personnel. In 2013, the SLCFD operations section 
conducted over 3,000 business inspections.70 Combined with the over 4,000 permit and 
new business license inspections conducted by the SLCFPB, this represents a significant 
amount of access into business occupancies in SLC. The fire department network has 
been established. These factors make the SLCFPB the ideal division for the development 
of the SLCFD/IC program. The next step is to integrate it into a broader pool of shared 
intelligence.  
(3) Organizers of Joint Planning, Preparedness and Training 
Salt Lake City Fire plays a key role as organizer of joint training, preparedness 
and response throughout the valley. SLCFD works in tandem with other city departments 
and outside agencies, both private and public, in assuring a ready state in emergencey 
preparedness and management. Three examples of this involvement are filling key roles 
in the city’s Emegency Operations Center (EOC), managing the Salt Lake City Local 
Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC), and developing training exercises with mutual 
aid communities and outside agencies like the Utah National Guard 85th Civil Support 
Team (CST).  
(a) EOC 
70 Salt Lake City Fire Prevention Bureau, Accela Permit Records Management System, Data (Salt 
Lake City, UT: Salt Lake City, 2013). 
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The Fire Department has been key in developing new technology and training for 
all of the EOC roles. Other divisions serving in the EOC include police, public utilities, 
streets, communications, emergency management, finance and the executive and 
legislative branches of the SLC government. Working closely with other divisions within 
the city fosters a better understanding of each other’s roles and builds relationships that 
promote continuity in response and recovery.  
On June 11, 2010, this theory was put to the test. Sometime around 2200 hours a 
crude oil pipeline broke, sending approximately 20,000 gallons of thick crude oil into 
Red Butte Creek. The EOC was activated and SLC resources including Fire, Police, 
Hazmat, Public Utilities and SLC environmental protection representatives, responded to 
the scene. Not only were the mitigation efforts developed in concert, but messaging to the 
media and the recovery plan were all developed with consideration for each department’s 
interests. Although the potential for a disastrous outcome was ever-present due to the 
nature of the chemical involved, the lengthy response ended without injury to civilians or 
first responders. City departments were able to work together with outside agencies as 
well, providing a united voice in the interest of Salt Lake City.71 
Although the fire service has been working with the Incident Command System 
since its inception in the wildland setting, exercising these principles across multiple 
department boundaries is instrumental in creating a more seamless effort in execise and 
actual events.72  
(b) The SLC LEPC 
Fire department leadership chairs the Salt Lake City LEPC. The LEPC is a key 
provision of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), 
which was enacted in an effort to establish “a national framework for Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to mobilize local government officials, businesses, and other 
71 Amy Joi O’Donoghue and Josh Smith, “Deseret News Utah Page,” Deseret News, June 12, 2010, 
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700039797/Oil-spill-in-Red-Butte-Creek-threatens-waters-
wildlife.html?pg=all (accessed Aug 20, 2014). 
72 Firescope California, Incident Command System for Fire Department Structure Fire Operations 
(Riverside, CA: OES Firescope OCC, 1994). 
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citizens to plan ahead for possible chemical accidents in their communities.”73 There are 
more than 3,000 designated local emergency planning districts throughout the country; 
most are established by county.74 Federal mandates require LEPC membership to 
include: 
1. Elected state and local officials 
2. Police, fire, civil defense and public health professionals 
3. Environment, transportation and hospital officials 
4. Facility representatives 
5. Representatives from community groups and the media75 
Although SLC is not required by law to have an LEPC, leadership within the fire 
department recognized the importance of creating such a committee to address concerns 
specific to the community. The SLCFPB processes over 800 hazardous materials permits 
per year.76 Before a permit can be issued, a hazardous materials inspector inspects each 
site. The sheer volume of hazardous materials stored, used or dispensed within SLC 
warrants the SLC LEPC. Each permit holder is a member of the SLC LEPC, and 
although not all are able to attend the quarterly meetings, agendas, minutes and 
notifications are sent to all members through the LEPC web and information sharing 
system.77 
The LEPC is central to sharing information regarding the “storage, use, and 
transportation of hazardous materials in the City.” The SLC LEPC and the SLCFD are 
recipients of federally mandated Tier II reports, governed by the EPA. The EPA has 
established threshold quantities of specific chemicals and requires Tier II reports be 
73 Linda-Jo Schierow, The Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA): A 
Summary (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012). 
74 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Local Emergency Planning Committees, July 25, 2014, 
http://www2.epa.gov/epcra/local-emergency-planning-committees (accessed August 23, 2014). 
75 Ibid. 
76 SLC Fire Prevention Bureau, FDM Records Management System, Hazdous Materials Permiting 
Records (Salt Lake: Salt Lake City Fire Department, 2013). 
77 www.SLCLEPC.com 
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submitted to the State Emergency Response Commission or Emergency Response 
Commission of the Tribe; The Local Emergency Planning Committee; and the fire 
department with jurisdiction over the reporting facility.78 Upon receipt of the Tier II 
reports, the Special Operations Specialist for the SLCFD enters the information into date 
sharing software, (CAMEO)79 enabling immediate access by response crews.  
This shared information also allows members of governmental entities and private 
sector businesses to develop responses to emergency situations and mitigate their effects, 
which is a mandate of the EPCRA.”80 The DHS continues to promote the added value of 
private-public partnerships, most recently in the 2014 Quadrennial Review.81 
Recognizing that prevention, mitigation and recovery will take a collective effort, these 
partnerships should not be underestimated. Private sector representation in the co-chair 
positions of the SLC LEPC allows industry leaders and administrators in the fire 
department to work together to identify issues needing attention and design meetings that 
are fruitful, interesting and relevant.82 
(c) Training 
Salt Lake Valley is a conglomerate of 16 incorporated cities and 6 townships.83 
Recognizing the need for integrated training, ten of the municiple fire departments joined 
forces to create the Salt Lake Valley Training Alliance in 2010.84 The key function of 
78 Environmental Protection Agency, “Tier II Inventory Form,” EPA.Gov, June 27, 2014, 
http://www2.epa.gov/epcra/local-emergency-planning-committees (accessed August 23, 2014). 
79 CAMEO is software developed by the EPA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA). It is used during planning of and response to hazardous material incidents. 
Environmental Protection Agency, “Cameo,” EPA.Gov, 2014, http://www2.epa.gov/epcra/local-
emergency-planning-committees (accessed Aug 23, 2014 ). 
80 Environmental Protection Agency, What is EPCRA, June 27, 2014, 
http://www2.epa.gov/epcra/what-epcra (accessed August 23, 2014). 
81 Department of Homeland Security, 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, Government 
(Washington, DC: The Department of Homeland Security, 2014). 29. 
82 As the Chair of the SLCLEPC, the author has witnessed first hand improved relationships and 
shared information as the SLCLEPC develops. Partnering with leadership from the University of Utah and 
Tesoro has provided a mechanism to share ideas, concerns and strategies in emergency response, mitigation 
and recovery.  
83 Salt Lake County, Salt Lake County, 2013, 
http://www.slco.org/bydepartments/yourcounty/govWithinSLCo.html (accessed July 10, 2013). 
84 Salt Lake Valley Training Alliance, Salt Lake Valley Training Alliance, 2013, 
http://saltlakevalleyfirealliance.wordpress.com/about/ (accessed July 10, 2013). 
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SLVTA is to create and implement training execises that develop relationships, 
familiarity and continuity in service delivery, standard operating procedures and standard 
operating guidelines. The value of these relationships was demonstrated in a large 37- 
hour hazardous materials incident starting on June 30, 2013. Members of the SLCFD 
worked with agencies with whom they had drilled as recently as 10 days prior to the 
event, such as Murray City Fire Department, Unified Fire Authority and the 85th Civil 
Support Team.85 
B. CASE STUDY: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SLCFD’S SECURITY 
INVOLVEMENT 
1. SLCFD’s Role in the 2002 Olympics Preparation 
In June of 1995 Salt Lake City won the bid for the 2002 Winter Olympics. 
Planning for a secure Olympics began immediately.86 Protecting more than 3,500 
participants representing 80 nations and millions of anticipated spectators and visitors 
took a coordinated effort.87  The venues, ten competitive and six noncompetitive, were 
geographically spread out between three different counties, adding to the challenge. A 
worldwide audience in excess of 3.5 billion television viewers and 9, 000 media 
representatives broadcasting the events assured this was a world-class event. 
Collaboration was going to be necessary on every level of national, state and local 
security and emergency response.88 To facilitate the security effort, the fusion center 
concept was introduced during the preparation for the 2002 Olympics.  
The SLCFD was integral to the original operational plan. According to the Utah 
Olympic Public Safety Command (UOPSC) After Action Report (AAR). The UOPSC 
enabling legislation authorized two fire and EMS representatives to sit on the Command. 
85 Pat Reavy, Quarter-mile Radius Evacuated due to Chemical Leak, June 30, 2013, 
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865582449/Quarter-mile-radius-evacuated-due-to-chemical-
leak.html?pg=all (accessed July 15, 2014). 
86 Dale Watson, “Testimony,” FBI.Gov, May 31, 2001, http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/the-2002-
olympics-cooperation-between-federal-state-local-and-private-agencies-to-address-public-safety-concerns 




                                                 
The Utah State Fire Chiefs Association appointed the representatives. They served the 
interests of “Fire & EMS 2002” (FEMS 2002), a committee formed to coordinate the 
disciplines’ Olympics planning.  
Dan Andrus, the fire marshal for SLCFD at the time, also credits fire officials for 
pushing for greater involvement of the fire service in the safety and security effort. He 
stated,  
Inclusion of fire service personnel in planning for venue security was 
instrumental in building working relationships. Credit is also due to those 
fire officials who recognized the significant public safety implication of 
hosting the Olympic Games and who were early and vocal advocates for 
joint planning.89 
Solely responsible for the Fire & EMS Operations Branch of the UOPSC, SLCFD 
was a key component in the Olympics security effort from the beginning.90 The SLCFD 
participated in regular briefings, both before and during the Olympics and was integral to 
the Olympic Intelligence Center (OIC). Fire Investigator Cristal Vandongen, who 
represented the SLCFD in the OIC, described the fire department’s involvement as,  
the collection, evaluation, analysis, and dissemination of relevant, accurate 
and timely intelligence to meet the strategic and tactical intelligence 
requirements of the UOPSC, the Joint Operations Center (JOC), and the 
Olympic Joint Terrorism Task Force (OJTTF).91  
Vandongen also functioned as a Team Leader in the Criminal Intelligence 
Collection and Dissemination Unit, further demonstrating the depth of the fire 
department’s involvement in the security effort.92 
SLCFD was actively engaged in Terrorist Awareness Training, Disentanglement 
and Protest Deterrence Training, which consisted of didactic and tactical training 
programs and had built several working relationships with key security agencies such as 
89 Dan Andrus, interview by Martha Ellis, Fire Marshal, 200X-200X (August 25, 2014). 
90 David Schwendiman, “2002 Winter Olympic Games, Utah Olympic Public Safety Command,” 
Olympic Intelligence Center Operational Plan (Salt Lake City, UT: David Schwediman, February 8, 2002). 
91 Cristal Vandongen, interview by Martha Ellis, Fire Investigator/Deputy Director, Fire and EMS 




                                                 
the FBI, ATF and the CIA. Every member of the department received an exposure 
protection bag that contained a level B protection suit, a respirator, duct tape, protective 
eyewear and rubber gloves. The Fire Department was put on alert for any suspicious 
activity and was given specific directions on how to manage witnessing and reporting any 
observed activities that were inconsistent with the conditions or surroundings. Salt Lake 
City Police and Fire Departments had drilled extensively on a number of active shooter, 
bomb threat and activism scenarios. At the time of the 2002 Olympics, Salt Lake City’s 
counterterrorist and intelligence management strategies and tactics were the model that 
other jurisdictions would aspire to in the wake of the September 11 attacks.93  
2. Hosting the Games 
Five months after the 9/11 attacks, Salt Lake City welcomed the world to 
compete, celebrate and socialize in the spirit of the Winter Olympic Games. By all 
accounts the games were a success – not only from the standpoint of spirited competition, 
pageantry and camaraderie, but also in security and protecting patrons. Special 
consideration was given to the effort in Salt Lake City due to the close proximity in time 
to the 9/11 attacks.94 “The Utah Model” as it became known, was recognized and 
recommended as a best practice for future events by national leaders even before the 
Games were over.95 On the heels of our nation’s most devastating attacks on home soil 
and political controversy over the planning and organization of the Olympics in Salt 
Lake, the security team, including the fire department, prepared to receive the world. 
According to Chris Bellavita, the Executive Director of Utah Olympic Public 
Safety Command, stated that, “eighteen months before the 2002 Olympic Games 
Opening Ceremony, the security group had 150 people in it.”96 The successes come 
down to the people, the plan and the ability to execute it. Bellavita goes on to explain that 
93 Derek Jensen, “Oly Security Effort ‘Model for Nation,’” Deseret News, March 9, 2002. 
94 Meg James, “NBC ‘confident’ with Russian security measures for Sochi Olympics,” LATimes.com, 
Jan 23, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-nbc-russian-security-sochi-
olympics-20140123-story.html (accessed May 31, 2014). 
95 Chris Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: A Strategic Logic of Special Event Security,” 
Homeland Security Affairs 3, no. 3 (September 2007) http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=3.3.1 
96 Ibid. 
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when the Olympics came to a close, the exodus was swift and thorough. He stated, “At its 
peak, Salt Lake’s Olympic security operations involved more than 11,000 public safety 
people. A few weeks after the Games were over, the security organization—like a circus 
leaving town—vanished.”97 
3. SLCFD Post-2002 Diminished Involvement in Security Effort 
Although the Salt Lake City Police Department has continued to advance within 
the realm of intelligence management through its fusion center, the Fire Department 
involvement has all but vanished. Today, many employees who were key to the Olympic 
security effort have left the fire department to work for private sector emergency 
preparedness companies like Booz Allen or federal agencies like the Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency and the ATF. Fire Inspector Vandongen is the sole Intelligence 
Liaison Officer (ILO) working for the fire department. The ILO has a cursory role within 
the Statewide Information and Analysis Center (SIAC) and the role has no formal 
recognition within the Department’s organizational chart.98 
The state continued to recognize the value of fire department participation in the 
intelligence community in Utah, especially for the contributions the fire department could 
make in protecting critical infrastructure. SLCFD was offered vehicle and office space in 
the SIAC in an effort to maintain a presence in the process. The SLCFD demonstrated a 
complete lack of interest in furthering the FD security effort by declining the offer.99 
The SLCFD does not have policies or procedures in place that govern the 
collection, use or dissemination of potentially sensitive information. This has proven to 
be problematic, where as recently as April 2014, law enforcement sensitive information 
was released to the press by one of the SLCFD combat crews.100 Controlling the 
97 Ibid. 
98 As the supervisor of this individual within her organization the author’s insights are offered as a 
participant observer. 
99 Cristal Vandongen, interview by Martha Ellis, Fire Investigator/Deputy Director, Fire and EMS 
Branch of UOPSC/Team Leader, Criminal Intelligence Collection and Dissemination Unit (August 24, 
2014). 
100 Caroline Connoly, Fox 13 News, April 24, 2014, http://fox13now.com/2014/04/24/officials-
warned-of-potential-gang-retaliations-in-wake-of-courthouse-shooting/ (accessed May 5, 2014). 
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information and messaging to avoid breaches of this nature will be critical if the SLCFD 
expects to receive additional information from the police department and fusion centers 
in the future.  
4. DHS Calls for Better Communication While SLCFD Security Effort 
Wanes 
In 2003, the federal government published guidelines that initiated the 
development of the fusion center network. The goal: to form a robust and fully integrated 
national network of intelligence collecting and analyzing centers, operating in 
cooperation with state and local entities. According to DHS, “The National Network 
allows the federal government, SLTT (state, local, tribal and territorial), and private 
sector partners to participate as full contributors to, and beneficiaries of, the homeland 
security enterprise.”101 This effort was preemptive to the findings of the 9/11 
Commission, which concluded that the biggest deterrent to information sharing and the 
likelihood of “connecting the dots” is the human or systemic tendency to avoid 
information sharing. As the rest of the country was ramping up their communication 
efforts, Salt Lake City Fire and the Utah fire service in general, began its gradual 
disengagement from terrorist awareness, intelligence management and law enforcement 
involvement as it pertains to Homeland Security. This is evident through the attrition of 
positions in the fire department previously filled in intelligence during 2002 as compared 
to today.102 
Several factors contributed to the disengagement on the part of the SLCFD with 
the IC mission. When the Olympics were over, it wasn’t just the energy, funding and 
national attention that left the area. According to research completed by Lieutenant 
Christopher D. Bertram of the Salt Lake County Sheriff’s Office, “the major explanations 
101 Department of Homeland Security, State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, 2013, 
http://www.dhs.gov/state-and-major-urban-area-fusion-centers (accessed July 7, 2013). 
102 Salt Lake City Fire, Organizational Chart, Dec 8, 2013, 
http://www.slcfire.com/external/content/document/3687/1885646/1/Pages%20from%20Organization%20C
hart%20Aug%202013.pdf (accessed July 11, 2014). 
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for the discontinuation of other Olympic collaborations were lack of motivation or need, 
lack of leadership, lack of strategic planning and no mandated system.”103  
Bertram’s work identified these collaboration construct deficiencies during his 
examination of the interagency efforts before and after the Olympics. Through his 
interview and analysis process he was able to identify the four main enablers to 
collaboration within the Salt Lake Valley during these time periods. They are motivation, 
leadership, trust and mandated systems. The research also investigated the undoing of 
well-developed interagency relationships when the Olympics came to a conclusion.  
The vacuum effect of the closing of the Games would have challenged even the 
strongest leadership in maintaining established coalitions. After years of preparation the 
emotional letdown of successfully delivering a safe and secure Olympic Games, in 
conjunction with the vacating of federal resources, the welcome perspective of getting 
back to normal was pervasive.104  
Maintaining the Olympics security framework may not have been a realistic goal. 
As the majority of the federal resources left the area, so did many of the cornerstones of 
that framework. The rapid elimination of a focused outcome, funding and physical and 
human resources, in conjunction with the emotional letdown that came with the 
conclusion of the Games were strong forces to overcome.  
The absence of vision and leadership within the SLCFD post-Olympics was 
demonstrated through diminished commitment of time and resources to intelligence 
community participation, in addition to letting valuable top secret security clearances 
held within the department lapse.105 
103 Chris D. Bertram, Factors that Effect Interagency Collaborations : Lessons During and Following 
the 2002 Winter Olympics (master’s thesis Naval Postgraduate School, 2008). link 
104 Author is drawing on historical perspective since beginning employment with the SLCFD in 1995.  
105 Cristal Vandongen, interview by Martha Ellis, Fire Investigator/Deputy Director, Fire and EMS 
Branch of UOPSC/Team Leader, Criminal Intelligence Collection and Dissemination Unit (2014 йил 
August 24). 
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5. Getting Back into the Security Circle of Trust. 
Twelve years later, given the national security concerns, the question is, what will 
it take to reinvigorate the Salt Lake City Fire Department’s participation in the national, 
state and local security effort?  
By nature of the core responsibilities the Fire Department has to the community, 
several key foundational elements are in place within the SLCFD. There is growing 
national support for greater fire department involvement in the national security effort. 
DHS, DOJ and IAFC are just a few examples of how this movement is being supported at 
a federal level.106,107 The work being done by FDNY and the Orange County Sheriff’s 
Office are examples of the vigorous efforts taking place at the local level, which will be 
explored further in this research.108,109 It is equally important to note that support is not 
universal. Addressing the concerns of those who are not in agreement with including the 
fire service in national security efforts will drive the extent and nature of the effort. 
This research will identify the stakeholders within the Fire intelligence mission 
model, assess the potential concerns and desires of those stakeholders and develop a plan 
for building trust and common purpose in the program. 
106 Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice, Fire Service Integration for 
Fusion Centers (Washington, DC: DHS & DOJ, 2012). 
107 International Association of Fire Chiefs, “IAFC Terrorism and Homelands Security Committee,” 
International Association of Fire Chiefs, 2012, 
http://www.iafc.org/committees/content.cfm?itemnumber=4648&navitemnumber=4439 (accessed June 26, 
2013). 
108 FDNY, FDNY Counter Terrorism and Risk Management Strategy (NY: FDNY, 2011). 
109 Captain Nick Colonelli, interview by Martha Ellis, TLO Coordinator, Orange County Intelligence 
Assessment Center (July 15, 2014). 
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III. IDENTIFYING THE RELATIONSHIPS, TRUST AND 
COLLABORATION LINCHPINS 
A. THE SLCFD/SECURITY NETWORK 
The relationships necessary for the SLCFD’s effort to integrate into the IC are 
diverse. They reach across professional and political boundaries, and all stakeholders 
need to understand how the program can positively affect their area of influence in order 
for the IC to succeed. As the fire department develops an intelligence program and fire 
department members broaden the scope of their understanding and role in the IC, all 
departments, agencies and individuals within the critical network will need a clear 
understanding of their roles within the program. It will be equally critical to program 
developers to understand the rules governing how the rulers rule within each node.110 
According to The Dictator’s Handbook, how politicians spend money says a great deal 
about their loyalties; however, capital expenditures may not always involve currency. 
Allocation of time, human resources and other tangible assets can also reflect a leader’s 
priorities. A leader leads by the driver of his or her interests. If the interest is to stay in 
power, the allocation of capital will satisfy the needs of the essential coalition. That 
coalition can be the voters, who would advocate funding into projects creating the 
greatest good for the greatest numbers, or a small coalition of highly influential 
essentials, resulting in big gains for smaller numbers.111 Leadership looking to develop a 
fire department intelligence program would benefit from knowing the motivations, 
priorities and desired outcomes of all parties required for achieving success. It is also 
important to identify to whom the leaders of each node in the network has to answer. This 
will have a bearing on their motivation. The challenges surrounding the development of a 
fire department intelligence program are anchored in the ability of the individuals within 
the necessary network to develop and maintain trust; trust in the individuals working 
within the program and trust that their interests will be met. Understanding that 
110 Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and Alastair Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is 
Almost Always Good Politics (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2011). 
111 Ibid.19. 
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“partnership[s] should only be used when the partnership produces more in value than 
can be achieved by working alone,” defining those benefits and demonstrating how the 
policy supports them will be paramount.112  
B. KEY RELATIONSHIPS IN THE SLCFD SECURITY PROGRAM 
Focusing on the Salt Lake City program, the pairing list and diagram below are 
representative of the components of the network that will need to work together to 
advance the SLCFD intelligence program. 
Phases of Program Development and the Interdependent Relationships: 
1. Program Development 
Fire – City Administrators and Representatives: Mayor & City Council 
Fire – Fire: Admin, ILO, Firefighters and Emergency Managers 
Fire – Fusion: State Information Analysis Center (SIAC) 
Fire – SLCPD: Salt Lake Information Center (SLIC) 
2. Program Implementation 
Fire – City Administrators and Representatives: Mayor & City Council 
Fire – Fire: Admin, ILO, Firefighters and Emergency Managers 
Fire – Fusion: State Information Analysis Center (SIAC) 
Fire – SLCPD: Salt Lake Information Center (SLIC) 
3. Program Sustainability 
Fire – City Administrators and Representatives: Mayor & City Council 
Fire – Fire: Admin, ILO, Firefighters and Emergency Managers 
Fire – Fusion: State Information Analysis Center (SIAC) 
Fire – SLCPD: Salt Lake Information Center (SLIC) 
Fire – Citizens: Within the community, visitors and the ACLU 
 
112 Sharon Caudle, “Basic Practices Aiding High-Performance Homeland Security Regional 
Partnerships,” Homeland Security Affairs 2, no. 3 (October 2006).  
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Each of these stakeholders will have varying degrees of interest in the Fire 
intelligence program depending on what they can gain, what it could cost them and how 
participation satisfies the overall mission of their own agencies, departments or 
initiatives. 
C. THE FIRE INTELLIGENCE NETWORK MODEL 
The network model of these relationships is demonstrated in Figure 1. The 
relationships are illustrated with links and essential nodes. Overlaid on those links are the 
exchanges between the nodes. These are defined as communication, formal agreements 
or directives and laws. Each exchange represents an opportunity to enhance or weaken 
the relationship between the respective nodes. The balance and functionality of the 
network and consequent exchange of information is dependent on strengthening the links 
by developing and sustaining collaboration between each node. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Fire Intelligence Mission Network 
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The primary stakeholders are Fire, City Administrators, State Administrators, the 
SIAC, SLIC and the citizens the FD is sworn to serve. A separate dynamic exists within 
the fire department itself, depicted in Figure 2. The exchanges necessary within the 
SLCFD organization will also be critical to the success of the greater network. If there is 
a lack of unity on the part of the Fire Department, the stability of the entire effort could 
be jeopardized. Administrators and field personnel will need to be aware of the role they 
will each play in the program.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Fire Specific Intelligence Mission Relationship Network 
1. Relationships within Salt Lake City 
Both of the public safety departments in SLC, Fire and Police, have similar 
drivers, or motivations. The chiefs of those organizations serve at the pleasure of the 
Mayor. How well the chiefs address the Mayor’s initiatives drives the allocation of 
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money. An example would be air quality and carbon footprint. The mayor of SLC is 
environmentally focused. If either department fails to recognize this priority in their 
strategic plan, the city administration will manage those departments through budget and 
service model adjustments, or resource allocation. Reducing the number of light fleet 
vehicles and converting remaining vehicles to fuel-efficient models, are examples of SLC 
administrative actions taken to bring both public safety departments in line with the city 
initiative.  
Another consideration in program development is appeasing the city council, 
which is an extension and representation of the citizens of Salt Lake City on a more 
refined level than the mayor. The city council representatives serve to protect the interest 
of the citizens within their district and the city as a whole. Fiscal responsibility is the 
primary way this is demonstrated. Re-election hinges on decisions that add value to the 
greatest numbers voters.  
The relationship between fire and the police presents its own unique challenges. 
Agency bias will play a role as the program develops. The key will be in maintaining a 
clear distinction in roles and responsibilities and not trying to morph firefighters into 
police officers. Clearly defining, understanding and acting upon the respective roles each 
public safety official has within the joint security effort will be critical in managing 
mission creep. These steps will be developed in tandem with law enforcement, to assure 
that clear, appropriate parameters are set for SLCFD’s involvement. 
The motivation of the public safety leadership is anchored in demonstrating value 
to the public and city leadership. Both the police chief and the fire chief are appointed 
positions, not elected. There is an intrinsic value to public safety, but as budgets become 
lean and other infrastructure and environmental needs arise within SLC, competition for 
funds becomes more fierce among city agencies, including police and fire. The delicate 
nature of building programs that closely knit the two departments together can be 
favorable if the efforts demonstrate synergy and add public value. A good example would 
be the active shooter program currently being developed. Having an orchestrated 
response and mitigation plan with police and fire produces a more efficient and effective 
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service model.113 SLCFD/PD Active Shooter classroom training, administered in July 
2014, was designed to define roles, expectations and terminology. SLCFD and SLCPD 
officers taught the course in tandem. Concepts in tactical emergency casualty care 
(TECC) and rescue task force operations, developed by the Arlington Police and Fire 
Departments, are being introduced into the SLC response model. The mission, according 
to the Arlington County police and fire leadership, is to “get medical care to victims 
within minutes of being wounded,” in the active shooter environment. This includes 
providing immediate medical attention to wounded police officers, as well.114 
Specific training on utilizing the Incident Command system was also part of the 
classroom session, as leadership and command structure are integral to incident 
management. Classroom training was reinforced with a live drill involving both SLCFD 
and PD. The need for this training is not only demonstrated through Salt Lake City’s 
history with active shooter incidents. Just prior to an active shooter drill, scheduled to 
take place after-hours in a downtown mall in September of 2013, a man was arrested for 
making threats of violence, including plans to shoot guns and detonate a bomb, at that 
very mall. The drill was postponed.115 
2. Relationships with State of Utah Agencies 
The final key relationship will be between the SLCFD and the SIAC. 
Predominately law enforcement driven, Fire has played a small but underutilized role 
within SIAC in the past. It is a state-run entity, under the Department of Public Safety 
(DPS). The governor of Utah appoints the commissioner of DPS. Although there isn’t a 
constituency component to the commissioner’s position, the Governor must consider 
valuable public safety policy if reelection is to be considered. He must also exercise fiscal 
responsibility and optimize his budget.  
113 Police Executive Research Forum, The Police Response to Active Shooter Incidents: Critical 
Issues in Policing Series (Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum, 2014), 22. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Lindsay Whitehurst, ABC News, August 13, 2014, http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/probation-
suspect-utah-mall-shooting-plot-24968409 (accessed August 20, 2014). 
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The impact of this program on the motivations within the agencies, departments 
and individuals it will touch, again, will vary. Within the scope of public safety, value 
can be added by building reliable lines of communication. The 9/11 Commission Report 
made it clear that our failure to “connect the dots” through effective interagency 
information sharing played a significant role in the successful execution of those 
attacks.116 Sharing information without the development of the relationships early in the 
process creates vulnerability; however, the belief that one agency is more competent than 
another drives information hoarding and hampers the imagination of the collective group.  
3. Essential, Interchangeable and Influential Network Nodes and Links 
Value can be assessed within the network by identifying the essential, 
interchangeable and the influential nodes and links. The essential nodes and links are 
those that the network cannot function without or their absence would have significant 
negative impact. They are essential to the mission of the network. Interchangeable nodes 
are those that can be swapped out or interchanged with other nodes. Typically this would 
represent a duplication of duties that one node could perform independent of one it is 
replacing. The influential nodes are those that carry power or influence in the wellbeing 
of the network or the advancement of the mission.117 Measuring the importance of each 
node in this network is accomplished by identifying the interchangeable, essential and 
influential aspects they have within the system. Doing so reflects a measure of each 
node’s political and fiscal clout. Additionally, important is how they work into this 
system that is being developed from the standpoint of collaboration and trust. Identifying 
the essential, interchangeable and influential components directs efforts to the optimum 
use of the network itself.118   
116 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W.Norton & Company, Inc). 
117 Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and Alastair Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is 
ALmost ALways Good Politics (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2011). 
118 Ibid. 5. 
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a. Essential and Interchangeable  
All the nodes are essential because they fulfill different roles critical to the 
development and sustainability of the program. Interchanging the SLIC and the SIAC 
could be considered, however, sacrificing one for the other will jeopardize respective 
access. They both play similar roles within the network, however the SIAC has a greater 
state and federal involvement and consequent access. Although the SIAC is a state-run 
office, the Department of Homeland Security does have a representative working with the 
SIAC team. Substituting this agency with the SLIC would also minimize our ability to 
strengthen the relationships with the state DPS and subsequently the office of Emergency 
Management (EM).  
Fusion centers were developed and situated within states and major urban areas 
throughout the country “to empower front-line law enforcement, public safety, fire 
service, emergency response, public health, critical infrastructure protection, and private 
sector security personnel to understand local implications of national intelligence, thus 
enabling local officials to better protect their communities.”119 Having the SIAC within 
10 miles of city boundaries, the focus for Salt Lake City will be more consistent with the 
Orange County Sherriff’s Department in California. This model will rely on existing law 
enforcement-centric resources, building in fire-related elements as the program evolves. 
According to the Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center’s web page, “The 
purpose of this program is to ensure that fire department first responders throughout the 
urban area maintain a real-time awareness of terrorist trends, tactics, and procedures.”120 
Focusing on the SIAC and not the SLIC could also be done, but not without its 
shortcomings. The SLIC is in the Salt Lake City Public Safety Building (PSB). This 
building was built specifically to house Police, Fire and the 911 Center. The design of the 
building was aimed to reflect greater openness and communication—communication 
between the public safety officers and the public, as well as openness and communication 
between Fire and Police. Not working with the SLIC could have a negative impact on the 
119 Ibid. 
120 Orange County Sheriff’s Department, Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center, 2013, 
http://ocsd.org/divisions/fieldops/security/iac (accessed June 25, 2013). 
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relationship between Police and Fire. Opportunities to share information relevant to local 
efforts could be missed; information that could be useful in a joint response from both 
public safety agencies should be shared.  
The administrative nodes are going to play a joint role in any of the proposed 
delivery models. Interchanging administrative nodes from the fiscal perspective may be a 
possibility as funding options for the program structure could arguably be placed within 
either administrative budget. A complete replacement of one node for another however, is 
not feasible. Both nodes would need to remain from an administrative, regulatory 
perspective.  
The feasibility of interchanging any other nodes within this network would 
disrupt the balance needed between finance, information and trust. The nodes are 
intertwined to provide stability to the program design and removing one could jeopardize 
the stability of the entire network.  
b. Influential 
The influential components in this network are also in all tiers of the effort. 
Leadership will play a key role in the development and success of the program. Without 
the support from leadership in DPS, SIAC, SLIC, city and state administration and the 
SLCFD, the program will struggle if not fail. The support of the operations personnel will 
be equally as critical. They will need to see value in the program not just for themselves, 
but for the citizens, in order to garner buy-in.  
Because the participation of the firefighters in training, sharing information and 
receiving and acting upon intelligence is the lynchpin to the program success, developing 
trust in the program among combat personnel will be crucial. Therefore, those promoting 
the program will need to be effective at influencing all parties in seeing the value of the 
program and more importantly, the criticality of their role and participation.  
The citizens and civil liberty watchdog groups such as the ACLU are also 
influential. Citizens’ rights and the laws protecting them will need to be considered early 
and often as the program develops and strives for sustainability. The program must 
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demonstrate added value to the public in order to satisfy the drivers of all of the nodes, 
while adhering to all civil liberty laws and regulations. Paul Gordon describes “value-
based ethics” as, “ behaviors that serve the public good and maximize the values of life, 
health, and freedom, values that can be seen as being reflected in the Preamble to the U.S. 
Constitution.”121 Components of Gordon’s ethics map will be considered in the 
development of the SLCFD model.  
4. Value Added in the Network 
The development of this program could be a win for all parties involved as long 
as full participation is fostered. The public safety entities, SLCFD, SLCPD, SLIC, and 
SIAC will experience greater access and exchange of information. This program also 
includes joint training, both didactic and tactile, taking this network development to a 
higher level by improving the mutual understanding of respective roles and response 
capabilities within the city.  
Political gains may be subtle since protecting the public through prevention often 
goes unnoticed. However, developing more seamless responses to incidents such as 
active shooters, weapons of mass destruction or even natural disasters will result in added 
public value and demonstrate a worthwhile use of tax revenue.122  
The process of developing the SLCFD intelligence program will need to be 
thoughtful, methodical and inclusive. For the program to flourish, all agencies, 
administrators, and personnel will have to believe it adds value to their work, initiatives, 
and interests. Sharon Caudle states, “In simple terms, a partnership should only be used 
when the partnership produces more in value than can be achieved by working alone.”123  
121 Paula D. Gordon, “The Ethics Map: A Map of the Range of Concerns Encompassed by ‘Ethics and 
the Public Service,’” Gordonhomeland.com, March 2007, http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/homeland/ 
(accessed January 29, 2014). 
122 Police Executive Research Forum, The Police Response to Active Shooter Incidents: Critical 
Issues in Policing Series, Research (Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum, 2014), 22. 
123 Sharon Caudle, “Basic Practices Aiding High-Performance Homeland Security Regional 
Partnerships,” Homeland Security Affairs (Naval Postgraduate School) 2, no. 3 (October 2006). 4. 
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Assessing the value added within the partnerships will be a continuum and part of 
the ongoing evaluation process. The network and the threats and vulnerabilities it is 
designed to mitigate will be dynamic. Necessary adjustments to the components and the 
functions within the network will be driven by the desired outcomes. The value of the 
network and the overall effort will only be maintained if the network remains agile to 
changing needs. According to Caudle, “Managers of an enduring partnership will develop 
a process for evaluating benefits and periodically renegotiate the compact between 
partners.”124  
How those changes are managed can also have an impact on the value of the 
network. As Heifetz and Lindsky point out, managing the changes people are asked to 
embrace can oftentimes be more crucial to the success of the mission than the mechanics 
of the mission itself.125 As adjustments are made or players within the network change, it 
will be crucial to manage those changes openly with ample feedback and input from the 
stakeholders. 
5. Potential for Negative Impacts within the Network 
Any given location within the network can present an opportunity for failure. As 
stated early, no interchangeable nodes appear in the Fire intelligence mission network. By 
using the network models, the critical components of the nodes and links can be 
identified. The role trust plays in developing the resiliency of each relationship can be 
evaluated individually or on a network level. Figure 3 illustrates the potential negative 
impacts of breached trust within the various areas of the network. This illustration also 
demonstrates the impact on the network and consequently the program, if there are 
failures within any component of the network.  
The negative consequences of the collaborative efforts failing are tightly 
intertwined. When any one of these impacts arise, the likelihood of others following is 
high. The lack of participation and a willingness to share information due to trust issues 
124 Ibid. 5. 
125 Ronald A Heifetz and Lindsky Marty, Leadership on the Line (Boston: Harvard Business Review 
Press, 2002). 
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has been demonstrated in the past. Trust was compromised when fire department 
personnel shared sensitive information they had received from the SIAC. According to 
Major Jeff Carr, Utah State Deputy Homeland Security Advisor, that incident in 
particular had a significant impact on the SIAC’s desire to work with the fire 
department.126 
Another example is within the SLCFD. After the 2002 Olympics, when leadership 
did not trust in the idea of continuing on with its security involvement, tangible 
withdrawal from the existing network was witnessed. Denied requests for time to 
participate in ongoing Joint Terrorism Task Force meetings, and resources necessary to 
or participate in the partnership offers from the State of Utah, are demonstrative of the 
negative impact of not having buy-in from all of the necessary stakeholders.  
Figure 3.  Fire Intelligence Mission Negative Feedback Loop 
126 Major Jeff Carr, interview by Martha Ellis, State Deputy Homeland Security Advisor (9-July, 2013 
). 
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These network models allow program developers to assess the stakeholders from 
a recognition and evaluation perspective. The diagrams presented in this chapter provide 
a road map for targeted and global consideration toward trust and the viability of the 
proposed program. This provides a solid platform for analysis in the application of 
concepts and models developed for organizational trust. 
In the next chapter the constructs of collaboration will be assessed as they relate 
to the Fire intelligence mission model. Refining the constructs to the single element of 
trust will be the final phase before developing recommendations. The role trust plays 
within all aspects of the network models provided will be the cornerstone of those 
recommendations. 
6. Network Power Wheel, The Fire-Centric Model 
The Power Wheel concept comes from the Harvard Kennedy School of 
Government’s Executive Leadership program. The general premise is to map out the 
necessary coalition for a specific program’s development, implementation and 
sustainment, using a centralized node as an anchor point. This model allows targeted 
attention to each individual stakeholder within the network. By isolating each node, 
specific concerns or interests can be addressed in the development, implementation and 
sustainment plan while maintaining consideration for the network as a whole. 
Figure 4 demonstrates the fire-centric perspective, as the main drive for the 
program will come from within the Fire Department. Examples like the FDNY’s Center 
for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness derived the components of Figure 3. Chief 
Joseph Pfeifer describes how and why the FDNY intelligence network developed into its 
current structure: 
Through research, analysis and exercise design, the Center brings together 
Fire Service, EMS, Law Enforcement, City, State and Federal agencies, 
Fusion Centers, building managers, utility companies, National Guard and 
active military together to jointly develop protocols for challenging 
Homeland Security and disaster management incidents.127  
127 Assistant Chief Joseph W. Pfeifer, interview by Martha Ellis, FDNY (27-August, 2014). 
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The Salt Lake City network model captures the key components directly and 
indirectly, as several of the specific elements Chief Pfeifer identifies are participants in 
the SLC LEPC.  
 
Figure 4.  Fire-Centric Fire Intelligence Mission Power Wheel Network 
D. MODELING SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS 
Agency bias will be one of the more challenging hurdles to overcome as this 
program is developed. Identifying a methodology, developing trustworthy relationships 
and supporting that framework with consistent procedures and policy have demonstrated 
effectiveness in other agencies’ programs. FDNY’s Center for Terrorism and Disaster 
Preparedness (CTDP), founded by Battalion Chief Joseph Pfeifer, and the Orange County 
Intelligence Assessment Center (OCIAC), run by the Orange County Sheriff’s Office 
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(OCSO), are two examples of successful models in fire intelligence involvement.128129 
What’s compelling about these two intelligence programs is that one lies in the law 
enforcement branch of public safety, (OCSO) and the other in Fire (CTDP). Leveraging 
these and other known successes to demonstrate value to all parties involved will be key 
in building trust and ownership in the program. As described earlier, the leadership 
within public safety has to meet the expectations of the elected officials. Their survival is 
based on sound policy and adding value to the overall effort of protecting the citizens.  
  
128 Orange County Sheriff’s Department, Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center, 2013, 
http://ocsd.org/divisions/fieldops/security/iac (accessed 2013 йил 25-June). 
129 Lewis Rice, “Raising the Alarm,” Harvard Kennedy School, 2010, 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/publications/hks-magazine/archives/summer-2010/raising-the-
alarm (accessed September 20, 2013). 
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IV. COLLABORATION AND THE CONSTRUCT AND IMPACT 
OF TRUST 
“Technique and technology are important, but adding trust is the issue of the decade.” 
     –Tom Peters, business author130 
 
Trust is the main focus of this section; It will identify trust as a key element in the 
past security efforts within SLC, define the construct of successful collaboration, identify 
the elements (or components) that constitute trust, and demonstrate how they come 
together to create the phenomenon (often experienced as a feeling) of trust.  
A. HOW TRUST FACTORS INTO THE EQUATION 
If the overall goal is to reestablish a role for the SLCFD in the homeland security 
effort, the logical place to start is to evaluate the factors that led to the diminished 
involvement after the 2002 Olympics. In 2008, Christopher Bertram’s research aimed to 
answer the question, “What are the factors that explain why some of the successful 
collaborations used during the 2002 Winter Olympics endured and some did not after the 
end of the Olympics?”131 Bertram’s work identifies key factors that explained weakening 
of collaborations that were established during the Olympics. Hocevar, Thomas and 
Jansen identify the success factors and sub-factors that impact collaboration, illustrated in 
Figure 5.132  
130 Stephen R Covey, The Speed of Trust, The One Thing That Changes Everything (New York: Free 
Press, 2006). 
131 Christopher Bertram, Factors the effect interagency collaborations: lessons during and following 
the 2002 Winter Olympics, Thesis (Monterey: CHDS, 2008). 
132 Susan Page Hocevar, Erik Jansen and Gail Fann Thomas, “Inter-Organizational Collaboration: 
Addressing the Challenge,” Homeland Security Affairs (www.HSAJ.org) 7, no. The 9/11 Essays 
(September 2011). 
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Figure 5.  Success Factors for Collaboration Identified by Hocevar et al.133 
When comparing Hocevar et al’s findings to Bertram’s, similarities can be found. 
Bertram’s research involved surveying twenty-two public safety leaders integral to the 
successful security efforts during the Olympics. Of these twenty-two public officials, 
fourteen were with local law enforcement agencies, five were with state and three were 
with federal agencies.134 The findings are illustrated in Figure 6.  
133 Ibid. 
134 Christopher Bertram, Factors the effect interagency collaborations: lessons during and following 
the 2002 Winter Olympics, Thesis (Monterey: CHDS, 2008). 23 
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Figure 6.  Enablers of Collaboration Endurance 2002 Olympics.135 
Parallels between Bertram’s work and Hocevar et al. are sound drivers for 
establishing a framework in the rebuilding of the Fire intelligence effort and the 
necessary relationships. Having the nexus established between national and local enablers 
for collaboration, can the component of trust be established as the pervasive element that 
drives the constructs identified by Bertram? 
B. THE CONSTRUCTS OF TRUST 
This section will analyze trust from a large-scale, organizational level, as well as 
evaluate the subtlety of how individuals interact with each other, to either create or 
dismantle trust.  
1. Defining Trust 
Defining trust can be challenging due to its subjective nature, but most know it 
when they feel it. Oftentimes, it is defined by using synonyms in order to build the nexus 
135 Ibid. 
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between trust and a more finite definition; however, some argue that technique obfuscates 
the true nature of trust.136 Kee and Knox refer to trust in opposition to suspicion. They 
state, “Trust and suspicion appear to underlie many social interactions. Thus, it is not 
surprising that they occupy an important role in various efforts to account for the stability 
or instability of a wide variety of human relationships.”137 Viewing trust as a reflection 
of predictability, it can foster or undermine security and stability of relationships. Mayer, 
Davis and Schoorman point out, however, “The need for trust only arises in a risky 
situation.”138 Since risk can be subjective, it will be critical to recognize conditions 
within the program planning, implementation and sustainment phases that could be risky 
to the participants. 
An early theorist, J.B. Rotter, defined trust as “an expectancy held by an 
individual or a group that the word, promise, verbal or written statement of another 
individual or group can be relied upon,”139 However, Mayer et al. point out that Rotter’s 
definition “focuses on a generalized trust of others.” 
Mayer proposes that trust is more the synergistic sum of its parts; as the variables 
change so does the overall sense of trusting. The constructs of Mayer et al’s 
organizational trust model include the trustor, the trustee, risk and context.140 The trustor, 
being the one presumably doing the trusting; the trustee, being the one needing to be 
trusted; the risk is what’s at stake if things don’t go how the trustor envisions; and the 
context includes the variables or circumstances surrounding the situation. Variations 
between them will have an effect on the overall trust the trustor has in the trustee and the 
choices they’ll make.141  
136 Jennifer Moyer, Trust and PR Practice, January 14, 2011, http://www.instituteforpr.org/trust-and-
pr-practice/ (accessed June 26, 2014). 
137 Herbert W. Kee and Robert E. Knox, “Conceptual and Methodological Considerations in the Study 
of Trust and Suspicion,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 14, no. 3 (1970): 357–366. 
138 Roger C. Mayer, James H. Davis and F. David Schoorman, “An Integrative Model of 
Organizational Trust,” The Academy of Management Review 20, no. 3 (July 1995): 711. 
139 J. B. Rotter, “A new Scale for the Mearsuement of Interpersonal Trust,” Journal of Personality 35 
(1967): 651. 
140 Roger C. Mayer, James H. Davis and F. David Schoorman, “An Integrative Model of 
Organizational Trust,” The Academy of Management Review 20, no. 3 (July 1995): 711. 
141 Ibid. 
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Mayer et al. looked further into the characteristics of the trustee, or that group or 
individual seeking or needing to be trusted in a given relationship, i.e. to be trustworthy. 
The three key components of trustworthiness are identified as ability, benevolence and 
integrity.142 (Figure 7) Demonstrating the ability to perform a task, the benevolence to 
care about the good of the task and the integrity to complete the task as promised are 
positive influencers of trust.  
 
Figure 7.  Mayer et al. Dyadic Organizational Trust Model.143 
Mayer et al. define trust as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the 
actions of another party based on the expectations that the other will perform a particular 
action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other 
party.”144 This is consistent with Sharon Caudle’s assessment of cooperation. Caudle 
142 Ibid. 
143 Roger C. Mayer, James H. Davis and f. David Schoorman, “An Integrative Model of 




                                                 
identifies a study that demonstrates how successful collaborations occur when all parties 
recognize the vulnerability and interdependence necessary for the partnership to function. 
Additionally, these partnerships will succeed when clear roles, responsibilities and 
procedures are established.145 This also supports the idea that mission creep needs to be 
avoided with clear policies, procedures and memorandums of understanding (MOUs). 
2. The Trustee, Benevolence and Trade 
Trust can be fleeting depending on disruptive triggers. As the fire intelligence 
program is developed, the focus will be on the attributes the trustee contributes to 
developing trust. The goal will be to minimize vulnerability of all parties by fostering a 
high level of trust. Moyer states, “To overcome the anxiety created by putting ourselves 
in a vulnerable position, we cognitively, and affectively, evaluate the trustee on having 
certain qualities.” She goes on to cite the characteristics of trustworthiness as measured in 
previous research as, “benevolence, competence, honesty, integrity, reliability, 
predictability, good judgment, concern and openness.”146 
The role of benevolence in an individual and organization’s ability to build trust 
may be difficult to measure, but it could carry significant weight in the final outcome. 
Philosopher David Kelley’s defines benevolence as, “A commitment to achieving the 
values derivable from life with other people in society, by treating them as potential 
trading partners, recognizing their humanity, independence, and individuality, and the 
harmony between their interests and ours.”147  
The concept of trade extends past the boundaries of material goods. Non-material 
values can be traded, as well, demonstrated through friendships, exchange of knowledge, 
love and mutual protection.148 According to Ayn Rand, philosopher and novelist, “Love, 
145 Sharon Caudle, “Basic Practices Aiding High-Performance Homeland Security Regional 
Partnerships,” Homeland Security Affairs (Naval Postgraduate School) 2, no. 3 (October 2006). 
146 Jennifer Moyer, Trust and PR Practice, January 14, 2011, http://www.instituteforpr.org/trust-and-
pr-practice/ (accessed June 26, 2014). 
147 Jeff Landauer and Joseph Rowlands, “Importance of Philosophy, Ethics_Benevolence,” 
Importance of Philosophy, 2001, http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Ethics_Benevolence.html 
(accessed Aug 20, 2014). 
148 Ibid. 
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friendship, respect, admiration, are the emotional response of one man to the virtues of 
another, the spiritual payment given in exchange for the personal, selfish pleasure which 
one man derives from the virtues of another man’s character.”149 The Trader Principle is 
predicated on “attaining value from other people through mutually beneficial trade rather 
than force, fraud, or parasitism.”150  
This is consistent with Caudle’s assertion that highly functional partnerships are 
driven by mutual benefit.151 People are willing to enter into a trade agreement based on 
value added and the social capital carried by the other parties. In the case of the Fire 
intelligence program, demonstrating those attributes will equate to the willingness to 
genuinely participate and contribute value to the success of the effort.  
3. Focusing on the How over the What 
In the book, From Good to Great, Jim Collins wrote a chapter called, First 
Who…Then What.152 The significant finding of his research on the core of successful 
companies revealed what distinguishes successful organizations. He states, “The 
executives who ignited the transformations from good to great did not first figure out 
where to drive the bus and then get people to take it there. No, they first got the right 
people on the bus (and the wrong people off the bus) and then figured out where to drive 
it.”153 
Placing the focus on the players above the finite mission demonstrates 
tremendous faith in all three constructs of trustworthiness within those individuals or 
organizations. Organizational trustworthiness is a function of the individuals within the 
organization.  
149 Jeff Landauer and Joseph Rowlands, “Importance of Philosophy, The Trader Principle,” 
Importance of Philosophy, 2001, http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Ethics_TraderPrincliple.html 
(accessed August 23, 2014). 
150 Ibid. 
151 Sharon Caudle, “Basic Practices Aiding High-Performance Homeland Security Regional 
Partnerships,” Homeland Security Affairs (Naval Postgraduate School) 2, no. 3 (October 2006). 4. 
152 Jim Collins, Good To Great (New York: HarperCollins Publishers. 2001). 41. 
153 Ibid. 
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Finding effective ways to assess trustworthiness as a measure of benevolence can 
be challenging. The Arbinger Institute (Arbinger), founded by C. Terry Warner, professor 
emeritus of philosophy at Brigham Young University, has developed tangible methods 
for individuals or groups to assess their effectiveness by focusing on the core of trust, 
specifically the basis for influence.  
Considering that the recognition of the humanity of others is central to Kelly’s 
definition of benevolence, how do we know when we are recognizing the humanity of 
those with whom we wish to enter into trade? Consistent with Collin’s findings, Arbinger 
makes a clear distinction between the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of doing business. The ‘what’ 
is usually the mechanics of a behavior or the method of accomplishing a task; much like 
the mechanics of setting up the framework for a fire department intelligence program. 
Yet the ‘how’ is what creates the distinction between programs that flourish verses those 
that limp toward failure.154  
The basis of the ‘how’ is seated in how we see other people and the impact that 
has on how we interact with them.155 The principle is rooted in the philosopher Martin 
Buber’s observation that in all relationships, we either see the people in our lives as a 
person, like us, or as an object, not like us.156 When people are seen as objects, it can be 
in one of three ways; they are an obstruction, a vehicle, or are an irrelevance to us.157 
Regardless, the results are the same. They are treated differently than we would expect to 
be treated ourselves. When individuals sense disparity in a relationship, and their sense of 
value is compromised, their willingness to engage in fruitful dialogue diminishes. Once 
this happens, the ability to influence decreases, social capital diminishes, and the 
willingness to trade becomes less likely. 
154 The Arbinger Institute, Leadership and Self Deception (San Francisco: Berett-Koehler Publishers. 
2010). 
155 The Arbinger Institute, Arbinger History, 2014, http://arbinger.com/history/ (accessed August 23, 
2014). 
156 Ibid. 
157 The Arbinger Institute, The Anatomy of Peace; Resolving the Heart of Conflict (San Francisco: 
Berrett-Koehler Publishers. 2006). 
 60 
                                                 
C. BUILDING THE TRUST NEXUS 
Within the context of the relationships that have been identified as essential to the 
Fire intelligence mission model, what can be drawn from Bertram’s findings and the 
trustee factors from the organizational trust model? The first step is to recognize that all 
components of Bertram’s enablers to collaboration development and endurance are 
related to trust. The second step is to identify specific hurdles in the program 
development, implementation and sustainment phases and measure solutions with the 
constructs of the trust model. Focusing on social capital, felt need, strategic planning and 
mandated systems, the common thread of trust can be identified. These constructs can be 
analyzed individually while anticipating greater significance with the sum of the whole. 
Burt concludes from his review of several interpretations, social capital is widely 
viewed as a metaphor “in which social structure is a kind of capital that can create for 
certain individuals or groups a competitive advantage in pursuing their ends. Better 
connected people enjoy higher returns.”158 Identifying trust as a component of social 
capital combined with the value added to pursuing ends afforded with social capital, it is 
clear that trust will impact this construct of developing collaborative efforts. 
1. Felt Need 
In the context of security in the Salt Lake area, felt need has faded since the 
Olympics ended. The influx of millions of visitors to the Salt Lake area disappeared 
within weeks of the closing ceremonies of the Olympics. Mike Stever, Emergency 
Management Director for Salt Lake City in 2004, describes the homeland security effort 
in Salt Lake as “similar in comparison to the preparation for the Olympics; however, you 
obviously can’t put a fence around it.”159 Not being able to contain or define a threat in 
Utah as succinctly as during the Olympics presents a challenge to those wishing to 
advance prevention and preparation efforts. Scott Behunin, CHSD graduate, describes the 
Utah homeland security preparation effort in the post-Olympic environment: “It feels like 
158 Ronald S. Burt, “Structural Holes versus Network Closure as Social Captial,” Chicagobooth, 2001, 
faculty.chicagobooth.edu/ronald.burt/research/files/SHNC.pdf (accessed July 10, 2013). 
159 Scott A. Behunin, Homeland Security Advisory System, Thesis, Center for Homeland Defense and 
Security, Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey: CHDS, 2004), 20. 
 61 
                                                 
we’re preparing for the Olympics all over again, we just don’t know when they are 
coming.”160 
Not having a clear-cut, definitive threat or vulnerability like the Olympics does 
pose a challenge to the felt need of the Fire intelligence program development. Creating 
the sense of relevance in developing an intelligence program within the SLCFD requires 
trust in the need. Salt Lake City has several unique Homeland Security challenges. Even 
with a cursory assessment, the greater Salt Lake area can be identified as a target-rich 
environment for domestic or international terrorist attacks. We have significant 
infrastructure target potential, hazardous materials storage and use facilities and a high 
profile, globally recognized religious organization’s headquarters within our response 
district.  
Publications from the ALF have named Utah as a key target for mink farm 
attacks, as well.161 Utah is familiar with ALF activity as the group was responsible for 
the 1995 fire at Tandy Leather store in Salt Lake City.162 The area’s potential 
vulnerabilities measured against previous experience with extreme behavior within the 
community, supports the development of an intelligence program within the SLCFD. 
Building a plausible case for developing the program is founded in the ability to 
present compelling evidence to support felt need. Bertram’s data showed that one-third of 
those interviewed reported “that trust cannot be developed in the middle of a crisis.”163 
This point cannot be made too often. 
2. Strategic Planning 
When done collectively, strategic planning provides the opportunity for 
individual interests to be addressed within the scope of the larger project. Part of the 
160 Ibid. 
161 Roxeanne Vainuku, KUTV.com, June 18, 2013, http://www.kutv.com/news/top-
stories/stories/vid_5368.shtml (accessed July 9, 2013). 
162 Southern Poverty Law Center, SPLC Souther Poverty Law Center, Fall 2002, 
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2002/fall/from-push-to-
shove/eco-violence-the-rec. 
163 Christopher Bertram, Factors the effect interagency collaborations: lessons during and following 
the 2002 Winter Olympics, Thesis (Monterey: CHDS, 2008). 
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strategic planning process is to make sure the “right people” are in the right positions. 
One state law enforcement leader quoted in Bertram’s work stated, “One of the biggest 
things about the strategic plan, without the players in the same room it just would have 
been a free-for-all.”164 This comment ties back to social capital. The working group has 
to have faith in the leadership and other participants in the program in order to trust the 
process. If the “players” are not part of strategic planning, the sense is that key decisions 
cannot be made and time would be wasted. These individuals had to be agencies leaders 
or trusted representatives for the given agencies involved in the effort. Those interviewed 
described how they selected their representatives. They focused on people with the ability 
to develop relationships and “build social capital and trust with their colleagues.”165  
Strategic planning builds trust in the system as a whole by bringing the right 
people together in the spirit of charting the course. It provides the fluidity that fosters 
perspective, innovation, and failure recognition and correction. Those involved can 
intervene early, avoiding commitment to poor decisions. Because strategic planning is a 
continuum, the process in itself allows for continual input and keeps the leadership group 
dynamic and adaptable. 
3. Mandated Systems 
Mandated systems demonstrate a commitment on the part of the administrators. 
Creating a mandate through administrative policy, procedures, ordinances or statutes 
creates a foundation of reliability. Without the support of all relevant administrators, 
programs can be stifled without financial support, human resources and other resources 
necessary for success. The integrity of the program is elevated with administrative 
support. Codifying the Fire intelligence program lends credibility to the effort and an 
anchor point to return to if efforts get off track. Bertram quotes one of his interviewees as 
saying, “I think at some point, of course, the system becomes more important than the 
relationships. We have to fall back to the system that we had in place when relationships 
164 Ibid. p 34 
165 Ibid. p 36 
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failed.”166 In worst-case scenarios, when relationships became inhibitors to the mission, 
the network could still rely on the mandated structure and trust the sustainability of the 
system.  
All of the components of Bertram’s analysis are human-driven elements of the 
Olympics security system. As long as people are involved, necessary or impacted, trust 
will be a key factor. Bellavita describes trust as, “the glue that holds special events 
coalitions together.”167 Trust will be at the heart of the Fire intelligence program 
development, implementation and sustainment recommendations, forthcoming. 
D. DRIVERS OF TRUST APPLIED TO POTENTIAL PROGRAM HURDLES 
The previous analysis linked trust to all of the enabling or facilitating factors of 
development and endurance of collaboration, identified by Bertram. Focusing solely on 
trust as the predominant driver of collaboration, what is the applicability of ability, 
benevolence and integrity within the Fire intelligence mission network and the individual 
components? Can focusing on trust provide solutions to some of the anticipated hurdles 
to success of the Fire intelligence program? 
When implementing a new program, obstacles must be anticipated. Three 
potential hurdles that will be analyzed against the trust model are financial constraints, 
concerns regarding public perception and civil liberties, and agency pushback and bias. 
Those marketing the program will need to leverage the components of the organizational 
trust model to garner support and counter the opposition to the proposed program. 
Remaining agile and willing to adapt as other unforeseen obstacles arise will also be 
critical to the success of the program development and sustainability.  
166 Christopher Bertram, Factors the effect interagency collaborations: lessons during and following 
the 2002 Winter Olympics, Thesis (Monterey: CHDS, 2008). 
167 Chris Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: A Strategic Logic of Special Event Security,” 
Homeland Security Affairs, 2007 йил September, http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=3.3.1 (accessed 23-
August, 2014). 
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1. Financial Constraints 
Financial hurdles will be central to the City and State administrative bodies. 
Funding a new program or an effort to make an existing program more robust will need 
sound justification and the ability to demonstrate increased value on a number of fronts. 
Available funds will also be a factor. Competition for whatever funding is available will 
be fierce. The onus will be on the program developer to build trust in the program by 
reducing the vulnerability of the trustor, or the administrative bodies, in this case.  
In chapter 3, the administrative drivers were identified as fiscal responsibility and 
added public value in policy development. Reducing vulnerability to the administrative 
bodies will come with demonstrating added public value relative to the cost. The higher 
the value-cost ratio, the more appealing the program will be. Providing implementation 
options will increase the probability of success. Implementation models will include 
variations in the program design that will present different funding options. Components 
of the existing program can be leveraged as assets such as the SIAC and the SLIC. The 
strategy will be to compel administrators to further develop those components as opposed 
to presenting the Fire intelligence component as a stand-alone.  
Examples of how similar models have added public value within their community 
will be helpful. The benefits have been realized in examples such as the thwarting of the 
Times Square car bombing, where alert, well-trained firefighters recognized the signs of a 
potential car bomb prior to it causing mass destruction.168 Intelligence provided to the 
fire department allows staff to focus resource and training on a particular area bolstering 
their ready state in an increase threat or hazard environment.169  
The exact configuration of the relationship the SLCFD will have with the fusion 
centers will depend on which models, if any, are most appealing to the funding bodies. 
For example, fire service personnel can serve as:  
168 Lewis Rice, “Raising the Alarm,” Harvard Kennedy School Magazine, 2010. 
169 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Kyle Dabruzzi, “Firefighters’ Developing Role in 
Counterterrorism,” Policing Terrorism Report no. 3 (New York, NY: Center for Policing Terrorism at the 
Manhattan Institute, August 2008): 1. 
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• Fusion/Terrorism/Intelligence Liaison Officers (FLOs/TLOs/ILOs) to  
provide  information directly to the fusion center and to facilitate vital 
information sharing between fire departments and fusion centers.  
• Ad hoc fire, emergency medical service, rescue, hazardous materials, fire  
investigation, responder safety, and/or building/construction code SME to 
provide analytical support to fusion centers.  
• Intelligence analysts embedded within fusion centers to provide a 
consistent emergency services analytical perspective to the fusion 
process.170  
Program developers must be prepared to support the viability and value of all 
proposed models. Citing the success within other municipalities, such as the Orange 
County Sheriff’s office or the FDNY’s preparedness center will provide reliable anchor 
points to the credibility of program development. 
2. Public Perception 
Building public trust will also be key. Failure to do so will not only impact the 
citizen node of the network, but could also lead to civil liberty violation lawsuits and 
decrease public trust in the administrative bodies. According to the American Civil 
Liberties Union, fusion centers “can employ officials from federal, state and local law 
enforcement and homeland security agencies, as well as other state and local government 
entities, the federal intelligence community, the military and even private companies, to 
spy on Americans in virtually complete secrecy.”171 Civil liberty concerns must be 
addressed in order to maintain the integrity of not only the fire department, but also the 
fusion network as a whole. Training in the sensitivity of the fire department’s 
involvement and access to information would be paramount. The potential legal pitfalls 
have been well vetted, as cited in Bryan Heirston’s  paper, Firefighters and Information 
Sharing: Smart Practice or Bad Idea?  Heirston concludes,  
170 Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice, Fire Service Integration for 
Fusion Centers (Washington, DC: DHS & DOJ, 2012). 
171 American Civil Liberties Union, “More About Fusion Centers,” ACLU.org, 2013, 
http://www.aclu.org/spy-files/more-about-fusion-centers (accessed July 10, 2013). 
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legal and operational issues may be addressed by firefighters using 
standardized terrorist indicators while operating as sensors of opportunity 
during emergency and non-emergency operations, but fire personnel must 
not be specifically asked or assigned to gather information on suspected 
terrorists or terrorist activities.172 
Along the same line, it is crucial to stress the importance of preventing abuse of 
privilege in the spirit of gathering intelligence. This can include purposely exceeding the 
scope of an inspection by looking specifically for evidence of possible terrorism activity, 
violating an individual’s civil liberties or taking sensitive information to the media when 
it is not appropriate.173  
3. Agency Bias and Possible Resistance to Fire Service Security Program  
Agency bias, as described by Chief Joseph Pfeifer, is when organizations “Create 
a positive in-group bias in favor of those who are part of the same group and a negative 
out-group bias against those who are part of an alternate group.174 Because members of a 
given group identify more closely with others inside the group, the tendency is to share 
information within that closed system and withhold information from outsiders. The 
interests of the individuals within the group are typically driven by the similar interest of 
the organization. This closed circuitry of information sharing limits the imagination and 
fails to allow for other possibilities that would come from an outside perspective.175 As 
Thomas Schelling astutely pointed out, “One thing a person cannot do, no matter how 
rigorous his analysis, or heroic his imagination, is to draw up a list of things that would 
never occur to him.”176 
172 Bryan Heirston, “Firefighters and Information Sharing: Smart Practice or Bad Idea?,” Homeland 
Security Affairs (Naval Postgraduate School) VI, no. 2 (May 2010). 
173 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Kyle Dabruzzi, “Firefighters’ Developing Role in 
Counterterrorism,” Policing Terrorism Report no. 3 (New York, NY: Center for Policing Terrorism at the 
Manhattan Institute, August 2008): 1. 
174 Joseph Pfeifer, “Network Fusion: Information and Intelligence Sharing for a Networked World,” 
HSAJ.ORG, HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, 2012 October, http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=8.1.17 




                                                 
Agency bias can also present as a sense of superiority. As people’s confidence in 
their skills and that of their agency increase, it becomes easier to discredit an outside 
agency’s ability to perform within the same arena. The problem is exacerbated if the 
outside agency suffers a misstep. An example would be the mishandling of sensitive 
information at the hands of fire department personnel. Jeff Carr, State Deputy Director of 
Homeland Security, spoke to agency bias when sharing a story about sensitive documents 
that were leaked to the media by the Salt Lake County Fire Department.177 There could 
have been several explanations for the leak, but the reality is, those types of experiences 
create a history that complicates networking agencies together. 
Counterterrorism efforts and intelligence gathering have traditionally been the 
role of law enforcement. As reported in the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, “a 
role in intelligence-gathering beyond identifying actual and potential hazards would 
represent an expansion of fire departments’ traditional mission.”178 Building trust in the 
program will be predicated on value added and assurances that we are not trying to turn 
firefighters into police officers and visa versa. Looking beyond firefighter competencies 
to the willingness of department members to participate will require value and assurances 
that are tangible. Firefighters and law enforcement personnel must see value in what 
they’re doing. Efforts to foster full buy-in will start by leveraging existing SLCFD/PD 
program development efforts, drawing on existing successes within the Fire intelligence 
model on a national level, and demonstrating value added to community, as well as to the 
individual firefighters and their peers. 
It is critical that members from both agencies feel confident that the program is 
not trying to create a hybrid position of police and fire within the ranks. Sheriff Jim 
Winder stressed the importance of “identifying and maintaining the roles and 
responsibilities of each member within the model. The goal should not be to create the 
177 Major Jeff Carr, interview by Martha Ellis, State Deputy Homeland Security Advisor (July 9, 
2013). 
178 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Kyle Dabruzzi, “Firefighters’ Developing Role in 
Counterterrorism,” Policing Terrorism Report no. 3 (New York, NY: Center for Policing Terrorism at the 
Manhattan Institute, August 2008): 1. 
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labradoodle of police and fire.”179 This can be accomplished by maintaining a clear 
distinction in responsibilities through policy and procedure development to solidify the 
distinction in roles. Identifying areas where responsibilities may dovetail will also be 
important.  
As individuals are asked to change or accept responsibilities that are contrary to 
what they are accustomed to, recognition of that change acknowledges a perceived 
sacrifice. Heifetz and Linsky address this issue and state, “It’s not enough to point to a 
hopeful future. Make explicit your realization that the change you are asking them to 
make is difficult, and that what you are asking them to give up has real value.”180 
Leadership will be critical to reassuring all sworn public safety personnel that the change 
in direction will be well thought out and thoughtfully implemented. Participants, from the 
highest level of administration to the line firefighter, should have a general understanding 
of the common vision and purpose of this program. Leadership, as the catalyst to change, 
must avoid becoming a lightening rod for conflict by continually making the vision 
tangible, valuable and attainable.181 
Utilizing the SIAC will be key to the success of this effort. As explained by 
Battalion Chief Joseph Pfiefer of FDNY,  
Network fusion is an information sharing system that fuses information 
and intelligence from multiple sources to allow decision makers to better 
adapt to a changing threat environment. It leverages technology to 
improve awareness and collaboration across different disciplines by 
connecting voice, video, and data communications at classified and 
unclassified levels.182  
The true purpose of developing this plan is to show value in fully integrating the 
Utah fire service into a vast, national network of information sharing with the hope of 
mitigating potential hazards and increasing public safety for the citizens and the public 
179 Jim Winder, interview by Martha Ellis, Sheriff, Salt Lake County (May 14, 2014). 
180 Ronald A Heifetz and Lindsky Marty, Leadership on the Line (Boston: Harvard Business Review 
Press, 2002). 94 
181 Ibid. 120. 
182 Joseph Pfeifer, “Homeland Security Affairs Journal,” HSAJ.ORG, HOMELAND SECURITY 
AFFAIRS, October 2012, http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=8.1.17 (accessed July 8, 2013). 
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servant. Creating this strategy memo lays the foundation for securing the necessary 
funding to advance the effort.  
Broadening the perception of involvement in a program of this nature can be 
looked at in the context of social capital.183 Burt states, “Society can be viewed as a 
market in which people exchange all variety of goods and ideas in pursuit of their 
interest.” As connections and ties improve or strengthen there is an increased probability 
of successful exchange. Being part of this system or network increases the value of the 
individual based on connectivity.184 Using information as a commodity, increasing the 
number of ties between individuals or groups will increase the chances of identifying new 
information.185 Diversifying the goods available for exchange can also increase the odds 
of sustainability and value. This concept is not new to the firefighters as viewed from the 
standpoint of “diversify or become extinct.” When the effectiveness of fire prevention 
efforts through enforcement of the building and fire code began to be realized, the need to 
diversify into emergency medical services became evident, and the fire service moved 
into a new realm of social capital. Today, 80% of the calls SLCFD respond to are for 
medical purposes.186  
The social capital metaphor also demonstrates the reciprocal nature of the 
intelligence network. The intent is not for information to move solely away from 
firefighters. Firefighters will fulfill the role of intelligence consumers, collaborators and 
contributors.187 Intelligence provided to the fire departments can allow them to focus 
resource and training on a particular area bolstering their ready state in an increased 
183 Ronald S. Burt, “Structurla Holes versus Network Closure as Social Captial,” Chicagobooth, 2001, 
faculty.chicagobooth.edu/ronald.burt/research/files/SHNC.pdf (accessed Jluy 10, 2013). 
184 Ibid. 1,2. 
185 Joseph Pfeifer, “Homeland Security Affairs Journal,” HSAJ.ORG, HOMELAND SECURITY 
AFFAIRS, October 2012, http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=8.1.17 (accessed July 8, 2013). 
186 Salt Lake City Fire Department, Salt Lake City Fire Department Annual Report 2012, Statistical 
(SLC: Salt Lake City Fire Department, 2012). 
187 Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice, Fire Service Integration for 
Fusion Centers (Washington, DC: DHS & DOJ, 2012). 
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threat or hazard environment.188 The Times Square car bombing attempt is a good 
example of when firefighters mitigated a potential hazard before it could do further harm 
to the citizens and response crews.189  
Demonstrations of added value may be leveraged to alleviate the trepidation 
police and fire will initially feel toward the program. It may be equally as important to 
take advantage of previous and current collaboration success police and fire have 
experienced in the past. An example would be the active shooter protocol training and the 
fire department’s involvement with medic support for the SWAT team. Both of these 
programs have created productive ties between police and fire that could be further 
utilized to promote the intelligence program. 
Collectively, the anticipated hurdles can be addressed by minimizing the 
vulnerability of the trustor. Tactics used by trustees to garner the trust and support needed 
to advance causes go back to the organizational trust model and Bertram’s findings. It 
will be critical to work from a place of integrity, with the focus on the greater good of the 
program. Systematically addressing concerns of the individual groups can only be 
accomplished if open and candid dialogue is allowed and encouraged. The need for 
greater fire department involvement in the national security effort is made clear regularly 
in current federal agency reports. Recent state level ILO training in Utah is also a good 
indicator that the environment is ready to accept a viable model for the development of a 
fire intelligence program.190191 
In her NPS Masters Thesis, Terrorism Awareness and Education as a Prevention 
Strategy for First Responders, Alicia Welch cites Malcolm Nance, author of The 
Terrorist Recognition Handbook, as stating, “The single best method of defeating 
terrorism is educating our first responders, law enforcement personnel, military and 
188 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Kyle Dabruzzi, “Firefighters’ Developing Role in 
Counterterrorism,” Policing Terrorism Report no. 3 (New York, NY: Center for Policing Terrorism at the 
Manhattan Institute, August 2008): 1. 
189 Lewis Rice, “Raising the Alarm,” Harvard Kennedy School Magazine, 2010. 
190 Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice, Fire Service Integration for 
Fusion Centers (Washington, DC: DHS & DOJ, 2012). 
191 First annual Utah State sponsored ILO training. Park City, UT. May 14, 15, 2014 
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security professionals (as well as the public) how to recognize the roles and motivations 
of individual terrorists, their cell systems, and the street-level mechanics of terrorist 
operations.”192 Why? Because the more eyes you have trained to the awareness level, the 
better the odds of catching something pre-catastrophe. This concept has been embraced 
with the Department of Homeland Security’s “If You See Something, Say Something” 
campaign.193 
E. CONCLUSION 
Weighing Bertram’s findings against the Organizational Trust Model developed 
by Mayer et al. identified trust as a key element to developing, implementing and 
sustaining the Fire intelligence program in Salt Lake City. Mayer et al. provide a clear 
framework for organizational trust that can help program developers recognize their role 
as the trustee within the model. The influence the trustee has on trust between 
participants can foster or destroy essential relationships necessary for the Fire intelligence 
program’s success. By utilizing models that exemplify the constructs of the trustee’s 
impact on trust, steps can be taken to develop the sense of integrity and ability in the 
program and its leadership, thereby minimizing perceived vulnerability on the part of the 
participants. 
Participants must also understand the role they each play in developing the 
program and the relationships. Successful relationships are central to successful 
collaboration, and each participant is accountable. Personal responsibility for how we 
view others and how that impacts the effectiveness of our own efforts must remain in the 
forefront of program management.  
Mayer et al’s organization model operates like a dynamic system. When a trustee 
is seeking to be trusted, all components must be considered. There will be times when 
significant effort will be needed to foster the trust of the trustor, depending on how 
vulnerable the trustor feels in the given circumstances. 
192 Alicia L. Welch, “Terrorism awareness and Education as A Prevention Stratety for First 
Responders,” Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey: NPS, 2006 March), 76. 
193 Department of Homeland Security, See Something, Say Something, 2013, http://www.dhs.gov/if-
you-see-something-say-something-campaign (accessed July 9, 2013). 
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V. LEVERAGING THE SUCCESS OF OTHER MODELS 
Analyzing existing programs that have attained sustainment could be helpful in 
garnering support during the development, implementation and sustainment phases. 
There are several fire departments in the U.S. that are successfully participating in 
municipal or state fusion efforts, in addition to fire department involvement in the British 
program CONTEST. Two successful models in the U.S. were developed by the FDNY 
and the Orange County Sheriff’s office in California. The organizational structures differ 
between the two. FDNY is more fire-centric, being driven by fire department members, 
while Orange County is more law enforcement-centric, with the sheriff’s office inviting 
fire into the operation. Both are good working models to draw from regardless of the 
driving forces behind program development.  
A. FDNY FIRE-CENTRIC MODEL 
Convinced that the fire service could play an integral role in improving how first 
responders utilize and share information with other agencies, Battalion Chief Joseph 
Pfeifer of FDNY founded the Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness (CTDP).194 
Recognizing the need for fire department collaboration with other agencies, Chief Pfeifer 
has led the country’s emergency response community to a service model paradigm shift. 
The CTDP efforts focus on research, training, relationships, and the weekly intelligence 
newsletter, Watchline, all of which have been acknowledged as adding value within the 
national security effort.195196 According to Chief Pfeifer, “FDNY’s Center for Terrorism 
and Disaster Preparedness engages public and private sector organizations in 
preparedness efforts by forming networks for information sharing, setting conditions for 
collaboration and partnering with others for coordination.”197  
194 Lewis Rice, “Raising the Alarm,” Harvard Kennedy School Magazine, 2010. 
195 Ibid. 
196 Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Security and Defense, FDNY and CHDS: More 
than a Decade of Homeland Security Education Partnership, Statistical, Center for Homeland Defense and 
Security, Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey: CHDS, 2014). 
197 Assistant Chief Joseph W. Pfeifer, interview by Martha Ellis, FDNY (August 27, 2014). 
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One of the primary areas of research has been on the use of fire as a weapon and 
the related tactics necessary to prevent and mitigate the subsequent emergency. FDNY 
has been the leader in this research and has driven the paradigm shift for first responders 
to rethink how they respond to fires. The term Mumbai-style attack describes the multi-
front attacks executed in Mumbai. Using fire as distracter, enhancer or a mechanism to 
cover a crime is not new. When considering fire’s use within the context of terrorism, 
however, a layer of complexity is added to what are already considered large-scale 
events. Attention must be given to the chance a fire was intentionally set and related to 
another attack method, focusing to developing strategies and tactics to combat the 
potential hazards.198The training that accompanies the research adds immediate and 
relevant value to the responding firefighters.  
Heightening the awareness of the response crews to trends or intelligence on 
specific threats allows focused training, appropriate resource allocation, targeted safety 
protocols and standard operating procedures that play a role in risk management.199 The 
most well publicized example was the response and actions taken by FDNY and NYPD 
to the Times Square car-bombing attempt. Both teams were aware of the warning signs 
present at the scene, worked together to protect the proximal population and mitigated the 
hazard with nominal negative impact to the community because of specific training they 
had received on responding to car bombs.200 Leadership also plays a role in successfully 
mitigating hazards or large-scale incidents. Chief Pfeifer describes crisis leadership as 
“the art of generating trust so others can adapt to extreme events.” 
Developing the relationships and response plans to successfully mitigate threats or 
disasters, is central to the Fire intelligence mission model. Chief Pfeifer and his CTPD 
team have developed relationships within the New York City municipal services, and 
reached beyond the boundaries of the City to state and federal agencies. Both are 
necessary to assure a coordinated response to potential Mumbai-style attacks.  
198 Joseph Pfeifer, “Fire as a Weapon in Terrorist Attacks,” Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, 
July 23, 2013, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/fire-as-a-weapon-in-terrorist-attacks (accessed August 2, 
2014). 
199 Ibid. 
200 Lewis Rice, “Raising the Alarm,” Harvard Kennedy School Magazine, 2010. 
 74 
                                                 
Pfeifer stated, “Building a sustainable platform for collaboration requires a level 
of trust among agencies.”201 He has accomplished this through inclusion, research, 
analysis and exercise design that adds value to those participating.202 An example was a 
partnership formed with the FBI’s NYC SWAT team. The goal was to develop a 
response plan specific to the multi-front attack. Dialogue led to tabletop exercises, which 
developed into full-scale exercises. In June 2012, the Interagency Tactical Response 
Model was released as a result of that collaborative effort.  
CTPD also sends officers to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) for 
one-year assignments. This is mutually beneficial as the officers receive current 
intelligence that can be shared with the CTPD and the NCTC gains perspective on 
information that can be analyzed from the fire point of view. These are a few examples of 
the value-driven partnerships that have strengthened the impact and influence of the 
FDNY counterterrorism effort. 
Chief Pfeifer has also been pivotal in solidifying the relationship the FDNY has 
with the Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS), a DHS-sponsored graduate 
and executive leadership education center. In February of 2014, the CHDS published a 
report showcasing the relationship between the center and the FDNY. Referencing the 
FDNY intelligence newsletter, the report states, 
In February 2008, [FDNY] issued first edition of FDNY Watchline, a 
weekly intelligence newsletter. Today, as the flagship intelligence product 
of the FDNY, it is sent via email and posted on several homeland portals, 
reaching an estimated 40,000 responders and homeland security partners 
representing more than 100 agencies.203 
The publication addresses fire service-relevant information like the potential use 
of wildland fire as a terrorist tactic. The FDNY model has paved the way for more 
effective utilization of emergency responders in the arena of counterterrorism nationwide. 
201 Assistant Chief Joseph W. Pfeifer, interview by Martha Ellis, FDNY (August 27, 2014). 
202 Ibid 
203 Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Security and Defense, FDNY and CHDS: More 
than a Decade of Homeland Security Education Partnership, Monterey, CA: CHDS, 2014). 
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Chief Pfeifer’s focus on research, training, formal and informal relationships, and 
relevant and timely bulletins has led to the credibility of the CTPD. 
Chief Pfeifer’s focus on trust and its importance to successful collaboration is 
clear when he spoke on developing trust between all participating agencies. From the 
beginning, fostering trust was a consideration, demonstrated by FDNY decision to 
“create a Center, instead of a Bureau for preparedness,” to demonstrate inclusiveness.204 
B. ORANGE COUNTY SHERIFF’S LAW ENFORCEMENT-CENTRIC 
MODEL 
The Orange County Sheriff’s Office runs the Orange County Intelligence 
Assessment Center (OCIAC). According to its web page, “The purpose of this program is 
to ensure that fire department first responders throughout the urban area maintain a real-
time awareness of terrorist trends, tactics, and procedures.”205 
Captain Nick Colonelli, Anaheim Fire & Rescue, OCIAC, is the coordinator for 
the Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) program. In trying to get the program started, he 
states, “Once it was explained to them [firefighters] the value of having them trained in 
observing suspicious behavior and the amount of work that went into the tips they 
submitted, the program gained speed.”206  
This is a critical point. As the program develops and moves into implementation 
that the firefighters will need to feel the work they are doing is valuable and is serving a 
greater purpose. Seeing the information the Orange County firefighters gathered being 
well-managed and eventually converted into intelligence bulletins that benefitted the 
greater firefighting community added validity and momentum to the OCIAC program.  
The momentum of the program is described further by Colonelli: “After a 
hundred or so firefighters had the training and were receiving Intelligence Bulletins and 
related products, word spread much faster and our growth has remained relatively 
204 Assistant Chief Joseph W. Pfeifer, interview by Martha Ellis, FDNY (August 27, 2014). 
205 Orange County Sheriff’s Department, Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center, 2013, 
http://ocsd.org/divisions/fieldops/security/iac (accessed June 25, 2013). 
206 Captain Nick Colonelli, interview by Martha Ellis, TLO Coordinator, Orange County Intelligence 
Assessment Center (July 16, 2013). 
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consistent, adding around 50 each quarter.”207 The leadership within this organization 
continues to develop social capital within the firefighter ranks. As the momentum grows, 
so does the credibility and confidence in the program.  
Colonelli describes the current state of the program in a recent interview:  
The continued training opportunities that we bring to the AOR [area of 
responsibility] are open to all first responders, and although the majority 
are Law Enforcement focused trainings, we allow our Fire Service TLOs 
to attend as well, which helps in building relationships across disciplines, 
and encourages Fire Service TLOs to maintain engagement with the 
Fusion Center. To date, since we stood up the fusion center in 2007, we 
have trained 832 Fire Service personnel as Terrorism Liaison Officers. 
Regarding bulletins, our center produces, on average, three products a 
month, which are distributed to our entire TLO network of over 3000 local 
first responders.208 
The OCIAC has developed a program that has demonstrated value to the 
community and the participating firefighters. The inertia demonstrated through the 
increased interest in the program is representative of the social capital program leadership 
it has earned and the collaboration endurance that follows. Leadership has been able to 
show added value through relevant information bulletins and training. This is a good 
example of a law enforcement-centric model that demonstrated key elements of 
development and sustainment of trust among the key stakeholders.  
As the growth of the OCIAC’s social capital is demonstrated through increased 
interest and participation, the integrity, ability and commitment of the OCIAC leadership 
is validated. The synergy of increasing participation in conjunction with the increased 
quality of the intelligence product is also a model for a desired outcome. 
C. GREAT BRITAIN’S CONTEST MODEL 
CONTEST, the counterterrorism program in Great Britain, is another resource for 
program development that could demonstrate added value to the community and the IC 
network in the US. The UK’s national counterterrorism (CT) policy, CONTEST, is 
207 Ibid. 
208 Captain Nick Colonelli, interview by Martha Ellis, TLO Coordinator, Orange County Intelligence 
Assessment Center (July 15, 2014). 
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comprised of four key objectives: Prevent; Protect; Prepare and Pursue.209 Four specific 
work groups or organizations have been developed to support the mission, as well. The 
Research Information Communication Unit (RICU), The Centre for the Protection of 
National Infrastructure (CPNI), The National Counter Terrorism Security Office 
(NaCTSO), and the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC).210Applicable components 
of this program to the Fire intelligence program are within the Prevent, Protect and 
Prepare branches of the program. 
1. Prevent 
Inclusiveness is at the core of prevention in this model. The Prevent component of 
the UK CT policy emphasizes the importance of effective communication and inclusion 
to attempt to stave off opportunities for radicalization and homegrown terrorism or 
violence. The goals, as described in an online lecture dated January 28, 2014, Counter-
terrorism in the UK Module II – Policy Response, are: 
• Communicate with people not just their faith. 
• Support common positions/purpose and denounce violence. 
• Counter misperceptions of “Islamophobic” foreign policy. 
• Utilize the RICU to promote the concepts of CONTEST.211  
By utilizing the RICU, which was designed to clearly communicate British 
foreign policy concepts across government agencies and the Muslim community, in 
addition to countering the assertions made by extremist groups and al-Qaida 
sympathizers from within and out of the UK, the relationships become mutually 
beneficial, inclusive and sustainable to all parties concerned. Getting the messages out 
quickly, accurately and in the spirit of exposing half-truths and misinterpretations, 
supports the goal of staying ahead of the radicalization effort of impressionable Muslims.  
209 Paul Smith, Presentation CHDS, Counter Terrorism Contingency Planning (January 2014). 
210 Ibid. 
211 Paul Smith, CHDS Moodle Learning Platform, January 28, 2014, 
https://www.chds.us/coursefiles/comp/lectures/comp_CT_in_the_UK_mod02_ss/player.html (accessed 
February 20, 2014). 
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One of the key lessons learned from the UK model of Prevent is the corrections 
they’ve made in their own approach to the prevent effort. The job of “prevent” initially 
fell onto the police. Because of the tremendous sense of urgency, the method was more 
aggressive than effective. The most critical aspect of Prevent is the intent at the core of 
the effort. The goal is to reach beyond solely benefiting law enforcement or fire. The 
relationship has to be mutually beneficial to all parties involved. Developing these 
relationships is universal and has great potential in the SLCFD.  
Currently, the SLCFD does minimal community outreach. Most community 
interaction, beyond the emergency response, stems from public education efforts in CPR, 
Fire Prevention and public relations events. Salt Lake City has an Office of Diversity and 
Human Rights, yet there is no involvement with the Office at this time. The SLC Police 
Department (SLCPD) has the Homeless Outreach Service Team or HOST program, 
which is a community outreach program designed to support the organizations that 
provide opportunities and services to Salt Lake City’s homeless population. The SLCFD 
doesn’t have any involvement in this program, as well.  
The four goals of the Prevent stand of the UK CONTEST policy can easily be 
applied to any population, in an effort of avoid oppression and exclusion and the negative 
consequences that can follow suit. 
2. Protect 
Protection encompasses protecting and fortifying everything from critical 
infrastructure, border security and mass gathering places of assembly.212 The history with 
the IRA and the risks that accompanied the peak of that era drove much of the critical 
infrastructure protection planning. CPNI has developed a network of Sector Information 
Exchanges, which include representation from private and public sectors.213 These 
relationships and communication pathways are vital in the dissemination and receipt of 
valuable information related to infrastructure protection.  
212 Her Majesty’s Government, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, 
Annual Report (London: Crown, 2013). 
213 Ibid. 
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Managing sensitive information, however, can be challenging. The CPNI system 
incorporates a ‘stoplight’ rating system to the sensitivity of the materials necessary to 
share with sector leaders.  
• Red messages are those intended for the sector leaders only. They may not 
be shared with anyone and may only be used by the sector leaders in their 
decision-making processes.  
• Yellow messages are those that can be shared on a need-to-know basis. If 
there are other decision-making members of the sector leader’s team who 
would benefit from the yellow messages, the sector leader can share the 
information, although judiciously.  
• Green messages are those that can be widely shared among staff and 
employees. The stakes are high for those granted specific access to the 
various tiers of messaging. Those caught releasing messages outside of the 
scope of their authority will lose all access privileges to the stoplight 
information-sharing program.214 
The NaCTSO, the police-run counter terrorism security office, operates within the 
CPNI. This office is responsible for the Counter Terrorism Security Advisory Networks. 
Some of the notable work the office does involves tabletop exercises with local business 
owners to help them identify their vulnerabilities and responsibilities in an emergency 
response. The NaCTSO has also produced several useful documents and tools for 
business owners and local agencies to use in protecting crowded places, hazardous sites 
and assisting the CPNI in the protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure.215  
Additional Protect models include efforts like that of the Shropshire Fire 
Department. Utilizing online tools, they are able to enlist the participation of all members 
of the community in the fire prevention effort. The program, called ‘Operational 
Intelligence,’ solicits information from the community via an email portal on the 
brigade’s web page. Concerns, including undocumented construction, suspicious activity 
and other non-emergent issues are directly routed to the Shropshire Operational 
Intelligence Team. The fire department then has documentation of the event and can 
214 Paul Smith, interview by Presentation CHDS, Counter Terrorism Contingency Planning (January 
2014). 
215 National Counter Terrorism Security Office, NATSO, 2024, http://www.nactso.gov.uk/our-services 
(accessed March 9, 2014). 
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follow up on the complaints, potentially intercepting illegal activity that would have gone 
undetected without the assistance of the citizen. 
The fire departments throughout the UK are also involved in the Sub Regional 
and Local Resilience Forums. These forums are designed to give emergency services, 
local authorities, government agencies, the health department, public utilities, voluntary 
organizations, businesses and the military an opportunity to share information and ideas. 
Forum participants are also encouraged to plan and organize local activities, including 
training and exercising, in support of the regional emergency plan.  
The UK concepts are driven by the desire to develop trust and inclusion within all 
of the communities within the districts being served. As the trust, sense of belonging and 
community are strengthened, the end result is inset cultures and native residents of the 
community becoming more willing to work toward preserving the peace and prosperity 
of the community as a whole. 
Information sharing is key to the success of the Protect strand of CONTEST. The 
integration of the agencies through continued reaffirmation of common purpose drives 
the multidirectional flow of information in the UK. There are several areas within the 
current SLCFD model where information sharing could be enhanced by integrating 
components of the UK model. Salt Lake City Local Emergency Planning Committee 
(LEPC) was created under the guidelines of the Emergency Planning and Community 
Right to Know Act (EPCRA). The idea is to mobilize local government officials, 
businesses, and other citizens to plan ahead for possible chemical accidents in their 
communities.”216 The LEPC is central to sharing information regarding the storage, use, 
and transportation of hazardous materials in the City. Further enhancing the quality of 
information sharing by incorporating the ‘stop light’ method of rating the messages from 
the city to industry leaders could be very helpful in taking the LEPC platform to the next 
level.  
216 Linda-Jo Schierow, The Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA): A 
Summary (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012). 
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SLCFD also needs to provide a better, technologically driven method for the 
citizens to submit information on non-emergent concerns or notifications. Moving to a 
more collective and organized methodology, such as that of the Shropshire Fire and 
Rescue service could provide a more succinct way of soliciting and managing input from 
the citizens. 
3. Prepare 
Key components of the Prepare strand of the CONTEST policy are developing 
relationships between key response agencies with counter terrorism roles and 
responsibilities, continuing training for response personnel and developing response 
policies and procedures. In doing so the UK will build its response capabilities, improve 
preparedness for assets identified as ‘high impact risks,’ improve collaborative 
emergency response, and realize improved communication and information sharing 
related to terrorist attacks.217 The Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Program 
trains frontline staff on preparing for large-scale, high impact events. Developing the 
continuity within operations and communications is critical to the successful outcome of 
a catastrophic emergency.218 The JTAC is the conduit for intelligence analysis, 
dissemination and the terrorism alert system and also a component of Prepare and Pursue. 
Collecting information, putting it into the right hands for analysis and assuring proper and 
effective dissemination are key components to connecting the dots and assuring all 
parties are prepared for the potential outcomes.  
The UK has not only successfully bridged the gap between various intelligence 
and law enforcement agencies and the courts; it has also effectively invited the fire and 
emergency services into its model. Because Salt Lake City’s FD and PD respond to a 
number of calls in tandem, either fire supporting PD or visa versa, it makes sense to 
prepare in sync. As stated earlier, Salt Lake City has had four mass casualty active-
shooter incidences in the past 14 years. Traffic accident, working fire, drug overdose and 
217 Her Majesty’s Government, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, 
Annual Report (London: Crown, 2013). 
218 Ibid. 
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psychological disorder calls all receive a collective FD/PD response. Successful 
development of relationships between key response agencies with counter terrorism roles 
and responsibilities starts with the trust. In Salt Lake City, personnel on the street have a 
strong working relationship. It is up to leaderships to drive the development of training 
exercises and joint response policies and procedures to further forge the relationship and 
advance the level of preparation at the street level. 
  
 83 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 84 
VI. FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. FINDINGS 
Creating a plan for developing, implementing and sustaining an intelligence 
program for the Salt Lake City Fire Department breaks down into three steps: establish or 
identify a need, define key relationships within the Fire intelligence mission network, and 
determine if trust-based program development can optimize collaboration within the 
network at all stages of program development.  
1. Is There a Need? 
The primary case study is the security success of the 2002 Olympics. Focusing on 
the Fire Department’s involvement and the achieved desired outcome of the international 
event, the case is made that the successful outcome was due to all components of the 
Olympic collaboration network.219 The research began with a review of operational plans 
for the Olympics to assess Fire’s role; government, scholarly and popular literature that 
discussed the mechanics of implementing a Fire intelligence program in general; and 
relevant literature that evaluated the basic concept and value added of fire service 
involvement in the intelligence effort, both from the support and the opposition. While 
DHS, the International Association of Fire Chiefs and the International Association of 
Fire Fighters support the concept, others dispute the validity and legality of fire service 
involvement in the intelligence effort.  
The opposition comes from two primary positions; the firefighter’s themselves 
and the civil rights, or citizen advocacy groups representing them. Firefighters leveraging 
their access into homes and businesses of the citizens, in the spirit of collecting 
information concerns these groups, and rightfully so. The perception that firefighters are 
conducting surveillance or spying on the citizens jeopardizes citizen’s rights to 
privacy;220 and an extreme interpretation or a poorly implemented program could appear 
219 D, Jensen,. (March 9 2002). “Oly Security Effort ‘Model for Nation”‘. Deseret News. 
220 American Civil Liberties Union. (2013). More About Fusion Centers. Retrieved July 10, 2013 
from ACLU.org: http://www.aclu.org/spy-files/more-about-fusion-centers 
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that way. This revelation will be a strong driver to greater understanding in the laws and 
the scope and implementation of the program in an effort to build and sustain the trust of 
these citizens’ rights groups.  
Firefighters tend to be more concerned with their safety and the preservation of 
their reputations. Firefighters are reluctant to engage in any activity that could be 
perceived as law enforcement because they do not want to be mistaken for the police221 – 
that could make them more vulnerable out on the streets. Firefighters are not typically 
armed, like law enforcement officers are. Illegal activity openly revealed by the fire 
department IC effort could have dire consequences if terrorists, gangs, or any other 
groups are involved in illegal behavior or engaged in retaliatory actions. This can 
manifest in several different ways, but primarily aggression toward the fire department or 
unwillingness to call if there is an emergency would be considered negative impacts of a 
poorly implemented program.  
Those in favor of the concept identify the role, sheer number and existing 
relationships of the firefighters as prime reasons why they are tailor-made for this 
expanded role into the IC.222 As counterterrorism efforts move into the community, first 
responders take on more responsibility in protecting their communities. Prevention, 
protection and response all fall under the job description of firefighters. The core skill 
sets firefighters develop throughout their careers provide a unique perspective into 
preventing terrorist or illegal activity in their communities. Enhanced training is 
available, focusing specifically on indicators of activity that could be considered 
suspicious and potentially malicious, and what to do in the event firefighters come across 
such activities. 
It is important to identify whether there’s a need for a Fire intelligence program 
within Salt Lake City, as well. Considering components of the City and the valley’s 
infrastructure, in addition to potential within private industry and the University of Utah, 
and the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints, vulnerabilities were identified 
221 Dabruzzi, D. G. (2008 August). Firefighters’ Developing Role in Counterterrorism. Manhattan 
Institute for Policy Research. 
222 Ibid. 
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that, if compromised could have catastrophic impact on the community. Some of those 
include major railways, hundreds of facilities housing hazardous materials and a nuclear 
reactor, housed at the University of Utah. 
Salt Lake City also has had several fatal active shooter incidents, intentionally set 
church fires and ALF activity that resulted in a fire at a local Tandy Leather store. Recent 
bulletins distributed by the ALF discussed continued activity in the urban and rural areas 
within the State of Utah. This history supports the need within the community for a more 
comprehensive intelligence effort by all first responders. 
The conflicting perspectives of the supporters and the opponents create a tension 
that provides an opportunity for analysis. Could these stresses be addressed through 
thoughtful, trusted process and relationships? The collaboration constructs and trust, 
essential to the process, were analyzed in order to identify solutions to potential conflict 
within the network.  
2. Who are the Key Stakeholders? 
 When developing a Fire intelligence program, identifying the key stakeholders 
that will be necessary for success, is paramount. Advocate and adversary alike, must be 
identified early into the program development process. Part of that procedure happened 
when evaluating the need, as discussed in the pro and con literature.  
Further assessment into all necessary components of the Salt Lake City Fire 
intelligence mission network revealed six key partnerships that would provide the 
framework of the program. The SLCFD would need to develop and maintain good 
working relationships with the police department, the SLIC, the SIAC, the City and State 
administrations and the ACLU during all stages of development and implementation. 
There are also specific dynamics within the Fire Department that will need attention and 
development. Each node contributes in its own way to the advancement of the program. 
Although the relationships will vary and represent different needs, all are equally 
important to the success of the plan. City and State administrators and representatives 
provide legislative and financial support, the fusion centers and the SLCPD provide the 
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mechanism to exchange and analyze information and the ACLU assures actions are 
within the scope of the laws protecting the citizens of the United States.  
3. Optimizing Collaboration 
Analyzing the network needs of the Fire intelligence program identified the 
stakeholders and their contributions to the effort. Also central to the analysis was the 
motivation behind each of the nodes in the stakeholder network. Knowing the interests 
helps program developers forecast the potential showstoppers before they come to 
fruition. If those showstoppers can be predicted through analysis, mechanisms to avoid 
them can be put in place early in the process. 
Because collaboration is critical and the Fire Department will need to engage 
multiple network components, the constructs of successful collaboration were identified. 
Hocevar et al. developed a model for collaboration by identifying what they determined 
were key constructs of successful partnerships.223 The constructs central to collaboration 
success are: purpose and strategy, structure, lateral mechanisms such as social capital, 
incentives and the people themselves.  
Bertram conducted a survey specific to the relationships developed during the 
2002 Olympics. He analyzed feedback from law enforcement leadership, trying to 
identify factors specific to the success and failure of partnerships after the Olympics were 
over.224 Similarities can be identified between Bertram’s results and the model developed 
by Hocevar et al. Bertram’s findings identified four key enablers to collaboration 
development and endurance: trust or social capital, felt need, strategic planning and 
mandated systems.225 The consistency between Hocevar et al. and Bertram’s findings 
provided validation to the collaboration constructs and identified a starting point for 
analyzing their relationship to trust.  
223 Hocevar, S. P. Jansen, E. & Thomas, G. F. (2011). Inter-Organizational Collaboration: Addressing 
the Challenge. Homeland Security Affairs , 7 (The 9/11 Essays). 
224 Bertram, C. (2008). Factors the effect interagency collaborations: lessons during and following the 
2002 Winter Olympics. Monterey: CHDS. 
225 Ibid. 
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Each construct was evaluated against the need for trust. Work by Burt, Bertram, 
and Bellavita was utilized to effectively demonstrate the nexus between the collaboration 
constructs and trust.,226227228 Distilling the constructs down to the single issue of trust 
simplifies the framework for program development.  
Mayer et al’s organizational trust model was the framework central to the 
program development.229 This model was selected because its focus was trust between 
organizations. It provides a succinct set of components within the definition of trust that 
allows targeted attention to the areas program developers have influence. The 
components are the trustee, risk, context and the trustor. Program developers, as the 
trustee within the model, must exhibit ability, benevolence and integrity as core traits. It 
is also critical to minimize risk by providing a well thought out plan with input from all 
affected parties. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
There are ten steps identified in this recommendation, however, leadership and 
organizers must be willing to assess the process throughout the development, 
implementation and sustainment periods of the program. Agility will be required as 
varying perspectives and priorities are brought to light through the development process. 
Each of these steps has been created with the primary consideration of collaboration 
endurance and the development and sustainment of trust within the Fire intelligence 
mission Network.  
Ten Steps of Recommended Implementation: 
1. Initiate meetings with decision makers for each collaboration partner  
2. Establish consensus on need and degree of involvement 
226 Burt, R. S. (2001). Structural Holes versus Network Closure as Social Captial. Retrieved July 10, 
2013 from Chicagobooth: faculty.chicagobooth.edu/ronald.burt/research/files/SHNC.pdf 
227 Bertram, C. (2008). Factors the effect interagency collaborations: lessons during and following the 
2002 Winter Olympics. Monterey: CHDS. 
228 Bellavita, C. (2007). Special Event Security. Homeland Security Affairs , III (3), 13. 
229 R.C, Mayer, J.H. Davis, J. H. and F.D. Schoorman”An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust.” 
The Academy of Management Review , 20 , no. 33 (1995): 711. 
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3. Develop unified proposal options to secure funding 
4. Develop strategic plan based on current and potential funding 
5. Draft policies, procedures and MOU’s between agencies 
6. Establish specific channels of communication for collection and dissemination 
of information 
7. Develop expectations and training program 
8. Deliver training to fire personnel  
9. Leverage existing assets 
10. Continue planning, evaluating and adjusting as needed 
 
1. Initiate Meetings with Decision Makers for Each Collaboration 
Partner 
The key agencies have been identified. The first step will be to reach out to each 
operational organization, namely the SLCPD, SLIC and SIAC and begin initial 
discussions on a more detailed vision of the desired outcome. Consistent with the 
findings on the role of trust during this process, the individuals selected to represent each 
organization will be critical. Making sure the right people are on the development and 
implementation team will be a function of the organization’s leadership and the team 
itself as it takes form. Effort should be made to reach out to influential contacts in the 
administrative offices, as well. Including the administration early in the process might 
afford insights into funding options that could drive initial program development. This is 
also an opportunity to develop the idea with administrators and invite feedback and 
involvement. 
Questions that should be answered: 
• What are your organization’s desired outcomes from this program? 
• Is there anything the Salt Lake City Fire Department has done in the past 
that has been problematic in maintaining open trustworthy relations? 
• What can we do to avoid that in the future? 
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• What can the Salt Lake City Fire Department do to best earn your trust 
throughout this process? 
• Who are your key players? 
Identifying the concerns of each component in the mission network early in the 
process will develop a sense of continuity in the process.  
2. Establish Consensus on Need and Degree of Involvement 
It is important that all of the key operational stakeholders are in agreement on the 
need and the basic development and implementation plan. Doing so will minimize the 
opportunity for scope creep, reassure those concerned with the mission strategy and 
tactics, and provide a mechanism to develop the necessary relationships. One of the first 
priorities of breaking into the intelligence field is recognition of the value of the 
partnerships and assuring that leadership of the organization understand the value of their 
efforts to the citizens, themselves and public safety as a whole. From that point all parties 
concerned have to acknowledge their vulnerabilities and reciprocal value to the 
partnership and build well-defined, cooperative directives.230 According to Chief Pfeifer, 
FDNY, the value of sharing information and “harnessing the knowledge of a team 
including fire, police, airport and Coast Guard officials under the pretense of 
counterterrorism was key in the successful outcome of the Hudson River crash of the 
U.S. Airways commercial jet.”231 Many of these key relationships in Salt Lake City will 
be forged through participation in the SIAC or independently, but it starts with the initial 
conversation.  
3. Develop Unified Proposal Options to Secure Funding 
DHS has identified three possible models for integrating Fire into the IC. In Salt 
Lake City, evaluating which option is the most viable will be a topic of discussion 
between the stakeholders. The DHS proposals are a good starting point and should be 
utilized when weighing out the options available in Salt Lake City.  
230 Caudle, S. (2006). Basic Practices Aiding High-Performance Homeland Security Regional 
Partnerships. Homeland Security Affairs , 2 (3). 
231 Rice, L. (2010). Raising the Alarm. Harvard Kennedy School Magazine. 
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Those options include: 
•  Develop the ILO position into specific roles and responsibilities in the 
SIAC and SLIC. This will include decreasing the current job 
responsibilities within the fire department to afford greater attention to the 
intelligence needs. 
•  Integrate a SLCFD employee more deeply into the program by creating a 
new full-time position in the SIAC for a person with fire department 
background. 
•  Create a hybrid of the two by splitting the expense of the employee.232  
4. Develop Strategic Plan Based on Current and Potential Funding 
Three key factors that have led to the growing success in integrating fire 
department involvement into the intelligence arena nationwide are value driven 
partnerships, relevant training and thoughtful implementation. Keeping those key factors 
in the forefront while developing the strategic plan will take utilizing all the assets at 
SLCFD’s disposal to best heighten awareness and contribute to a safer community.  
Incorporating a SLCFD employee into the fusion center full-time is equivalent to 
the commitment the fire department has made to the Utah Urban Search and Rescue Task 
Force One. (USAR) That position is filled by a captain-level employee at a cost of 
approximately $100,000 per year including benefits. The City bills USAR annually for 
that position.233 That employee is dedicated fulltime to the USAR team and does not 
assume any other fire department responsibilities outside of the scope of that role. 
Funding for that position would require approval from the Fire Chief, the Mayor and at 
least four of seven votes from the Salt Lake City Council, even though the cost for the 
USAR position is ultimately passed on to USAR.234  
232 Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice. Fire Service Integration for 
Fusion Centers. (Washington, DC: DHS & DOJ, 2012) 
233 J. Vuyk (2013 8-July). Financial Manager, SLCFD. (M. Ellis, Interviewer) 
234 Cindy Gust-Jensen, interview by Martha Ellis, Executive Director, Salt Lake City Council (July 10, 
2013). 
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Roughly 80 percent of the funding for the SIAC in Utah comes from the state. 
The remaining 20 percent comes from DHS grants.235 Developing a position under the 
State DPS will require support from the governor. The position funding will go in as a 
line-item budget increase for his approval. Legislative support will also be necessary, as 
the final budget approval will rest with the legislative vote.236  
Either of these models will require a strong argument for the program and the 
necessary position(s). The national trend to increase fire department involvement in 
intelligence management as demonstrated through analysis by agencies like the DHS, the 
International Association of Fire Chiefs, Department of Justice, and the fusion centers 
across the country will lend strong support to the effort.237238239 
5. Draft Policies, Procedures and MOUs between Agencies 
By formalizing the policies and procedures, and the roles and responsibilities, the 
partnership will be less vulnerable to communication gaps and mission failure.240 Within 
these guiding documents and contracts expectations will be defined including a clear 
definition of the agency roles and responsibilities, specific procedures for collecting, 
disseminating and using information or intelligence, and strict adherence to federal laws 
protecting citizens’ rights. 
235 Major Jeff Carr, interview by Martha Ellis, State Deputy Homeland Security Advisor (July 9, 
2013). 
236 Jennifer Seelig, interview by Martha Ellis, Utah State Represetative, Democratic Minority Leader, 
Dist 23 (July 13, 2012). 
237 Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice, Fire Service Integration for 
Fusion Centers (Washington, DC: DHS & DOJ, 2012). 
238 International Association of Fire Chiefs, “IAFC Terrorism and Homelands Security Committee,” 
International Association of Fire Chiefs, 2012, 
http://www.iafc.org/committees/content.cfm?itemnumber=4648&navitemnumber=4439 (accessed June 26, 
2013). 
239 Department of Homeland Security, State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, 2013, 
http://www.dhs.gov/state-and-major-urban-area-fusion-centers (accessed July 7, 2013). 
240 Ibid. 
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6. Establish Specific Channels of Communication for Collection and 
Dissemination of Information 
Operational roles and responsibilities within the network must be clearly defined. 
No task should be left open for interpretation. Specific names and back-up personnel 
should be identified to enhance accountability. Knowing whom to talk to on specific 
topics or information exchanges will provide an element of predictability, as well.  
Within the Fire Department that would include creating support roles within 
Operations. Identifying platoon coordinators for collection and dissemination of 
information will create a clear focal point for crews looking for guidance and direction at 
all hours of the day. It would also add to the tiering concept of information distribution. 
Intelligence that may serve a purpose for the leadership of the Fire Department, but may 
not be suited or necessary for the private ranks, would be the responsibility of the Platoon 
Coordinators.  
7. Develop Expectations and Training Program 
Identifying terminal and enabling objectives for the training program will be 
critical. Leadership within Police, Fire and Fusion must develop the roadmap that will 
best serve the Salt Lake City community’s needs. Some of the curriculum may have to be 
developed specifically for the jurisdiction; however, DHS, DOJ and the IAFC have 
produced training materials designed for universal use. In her NPS Masters Thesis, 
Terrorism Awareness and Education as a Prevention Strategy for First Responders, 
Alicia Welch cites Malcolm Nance, author of The Terrorist Recognition Handbook, as 
stating, “The single best method of defeating terrorism is educating our first responders, 
law enforcement personnel, military and security professionals (as well as the public) 
how to recognize the roles and motivations of individual terrorists, their cell systems, and 
the street-level mechanics of terrorist operations.”241 Why? Because the more eyes you 
have trained to the awareness level, the better the odds of catching something pre-
241 Alicia L. Welch, “Terrorism awareness and Education as A Prevention Stratety for First 
Responders,” Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, CA: NPS, 2006), 76. 
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catastrophe. This concept has been embraced with the Department of Homeland 
Security’s “If You See Something, Say Something” campaign.242  
Integrating the fire service into the fusion center network requires educating 
personnel on “criminal/terrorism indicators and warnings and providing protocols on 
appropriate mechanisms for reporting suspicious activities to the fusion center, in 
accordance with appropriate privacy and civil rights/civil liberties protections.”243 
Training will be necessary for the ILO position and the end user and observer. The end 
user and observer will include all fire department personnel. 
The expectations for a messaging methodology will also be critical. In an effort to 
avoid sensitive information from being released to unintended readers, a color coding 
system, much like that of the CONTEST program in Britain, should be implemented. 
Providing a clear distinction between messages that should stay in the control of the 
recipient and those that can be shared will maintain the integrity of the messages and 
foster confidence in the FD’s ability manage the information.  
8. Deliver Training to Fire Personnel 
Training is the least cost-prohibitive aspect of implementing this program. The 
DHS has several options for training fire personnel to the operations and awareness level 
in anti-terrorism tactics that are free to the participants. Emergency Response to 
Terrorism Self Study can be downloaded directly off the Internet, and the Anti-Terrorism 
Intelligence Awareness Training Program (AIATP) is a course that can be delivered on 
site in Salt Lake City.244 
Given the sensitivity of involving fire personnel in the structured effort of 
intelligence gathering, attention must be given to training in the legal implications of civil 
liberties. According to the SIAC web page,  
242 Department of Homeland Security, See Something, Say Something, 2013, http://www.dhs.gov/if-
you-see-something-say-something-campaign (accessed July 9, 2013). 
243 Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice, Fire Service Integration for 
Fusion Centers (Washington, DC: DHS & DOJ, 2012). 
244 Departement of Homeland Security, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, 2013, 
http://www.fletc.gov/about-fletc/ (accessed July 11, 2013). 
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All intelligence activities carried out at the SIAC are to be performed 
within the boundaries established by the United States Constitution, and 
all Federal, State, Local, and SIAC policies and procedures; all 
information collected, researched, stored, analyzed, and shared must be 
done in such as way as to vigilantly uphold the privacy rights and civil 
liberties granted to United States citizens.245  
Along the same line, it is crucial to stress the importance of preventing abuse of 
privilege in the spirit of gathering intelligence. This can include purposely exceeding the 
scope of an inspection by looking specifically for evidence of possible terrorism activity, 
violating an individual’s civil liberties or taking sensitive information to the media when 
it is not appropriate.246 Having the means to address these issues will be pivotal to the 
success of the relevant training and thoughtful implementation.  
The training should also include promoting the understanding that “partnership[s] 
should only be used when the partnership produces more in value than can be achieved 
by working alone.” This will help firefighters see that they are not simply doing police 
work in addition to their regular duties.247 Supporting documents and the successful 
collaborations demonstrated in Orange County, FDNY and Britain should be continually 
cited as sound justification that the program is mutually beneficial. 
Training will also be necessary on the messaging procedures for the program. 
Firefighters will need a clear understanding of sensitivity classifications for incoming 
intelligence, as well as what to do with specific suspicious activity witnessed in the field. 
Points of contact must be established and shared with the operations personnel and their 
leadership. Continually updating contact lists to assure accuracy and specificity will also 
be part of the ongoing training. 
245 Statewide Information and Analysis Center (SIAC), Utah Department of Public Safety, 2013, 
http://publicsafety.utah.gov/investigations/siac.html (accessed July 9, 2013). 
246 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Kyle Dabruzzi, “Firefighters’ Developing Role in 
Counterterrorism,” Policing Terrorism Report no. 3 (New York, NY: Center for Policing Terrorism at the 
Manhattan Institute, August 2008): 1. 
247 Sharon Caudle, “Basic Practices Aiding High-Performance Homeland Security Regional 
Partnerships,” Homeland Security Affairs (Naval Postgraduate School) 2, no. 3 (October 2006). 
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9. Leverage Existing assets 
Assets both within and outside the SLCFD should be leveraged to optimize 
success of the program. SLCFD has three key assets that should be included in the 
planning and implementation phases. The FD Office of Emergency Management 
(FDOEM), the Law Enforcement Inspector/Investigator Unit (LEOI/IU) and the LEPC, 
run from within the Fire Prevention Bureau. The FDOEM plays an integral role in the 
operation of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The emergency management 
position is relatively new to the SLCFD, however, current development of the position 
and the EOC will provide support to the mitigation component of the Fire intelligence 
program. The LEOI/IU is responsible for fire investigations and code enforcement and 
compliance. This unit has built strong relationships with the SLCPD through initial and 
recurring LEO training. These relationships can be leveraged to expand the depth of the 
Fire/PD training and response protocols into the active shooter and Munbai-style 
response model development.  
Utah is one of 47 states and U.S. territories that is a Nationwide SAR Initiative 
(NSI) state and Salt Lake City is home to one of 76 NSI Operational Sites.248 The SIAC 
is the critical link for the State of Utah to the national fusion center network. Having the 
SIAC within 10 miles of the core of the metropolitan center for Salt Lake is a significant 
benefit. With existing network infrastructure already in place, plausible arguments can be 
made in favor of expanding to include Fire. Integrating the Salt Lake City Fire 
Department into existing networks and enhancing the national intelligence network will 
assure accurate, timely and relevant dissemination of information. 
The LEPC will provide a platform to collect, share and knit critical information 
related to hazardous materials into emergency planning and response. The committee of 
over 800 participants will be used to collect, share and analyze information related to 
hazardous materials sites.  
248 Department of Homeland Security, State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, 2013, 
http://www.dhs.gov/state-and-major-urban-area-fusion-centers (accessed July 7, 2013). 
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10. Continued Training, Evaluating and Adjusting as Needed 
The domestic and international threats are dynamic. To allow a program to remain 
static, while technology, vulnerabilities and the threat itself change, would likely result in 
missed opportunities and eroded trust in the program. Structured evaluations must be in 
place. Evaluating the program can be accomplished through surveying end-users, 
measuring specific tangible impacts and feedback from supporting agencies.  
Evaluating the program is a continuum. Scheduled face-to-face meetings with 
network leadership provide opportunity for face-to-face dialogue and open discussion on 
all parties’ observations of the program’s efficacy. Formal and informal feedback 
mechanisms need to be encouraged from within all tiers of the information chain. Annual 
refresher training for operations personnel must be utilized to solicit feedback and 
maintain skills and engagement. All comments, concerns and suggestions should be 
thoroughly reviewed by program leadership.  
The program must also be evaluated on a regular basis from a civil liberties 
perspective. Audits of information gathering tactics should be performed to assure that 
operations personnel maintain the highest standard in collecting information. Any 
procedures that deviate from the established policies and procedures must be addressed. 
Only through unbiased and honest evaluation can the program be assessed. The 
constructs of trust must be at the forefront of any evaluation. The program must 
demonstrate the ability to produce useful intelligence and disseminate it to the 
appropriate end users. Through strict adherence to policies, procedures and MOUs, the 
integrity of the program will be established. The final component of evaluating the 
program is to continually assess intent. The core interest of the program is the greater 
good of the community. This cannot be established at the expense of civil liberties. 
Benevolence is defined as compassion or goodwill. It will take benevolence, strong 
leadership and continual dialogue to assure the core driver of trust within program 
development is maintained. 
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C. ADDITIONAL RESEARCH AND CONSIDERATIONS 
This research has been focused on finding the most effective means to assure a 
successful and sustainable intelligence program for the Salt Lake City Fire Department. 
The mechanics of incorporating other fire departments from neighboring jurisdictions 
was not a primary consideration. The inevitability, however, of other fire departments 
engaging in and benefiting from Salt Lake City’s efforts needs to be considered. Keeping 
the task at hand manageable was a concern of this effort, but the firefighting community 
in the Salt Lake area is a close-knit group. Consideration for keeping interested parties 
apprised of the SLCFD efforts and sharing any information, either on the topic of 
developing a like program or resulting intelligence, would have widespread benefit to the 
entire community. Additional research in the specifics of each individual jurisdiction’s 
needs, resources and development strategy would need to take place. The concepts 
developed within this thesis would be a useful foundation in that effort. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The 2014 DHS Quadrennial Report focuses on the greater need for information 
sharing and community involvement. Resources must be engaged at all tiers of our 
government and communities to assure a safe and prosperous country.249 The support of 
national organizations like the International Association of Fire Chiefs, the Department of 
Homeland Security and the Department of Justice are strong indicators that the fire 
service has a place in the national security effort.  
As a developing concept, it is critical to identify pro and con positions for fire 
service participation in the national security effort. Addressing the concerns with a 
thoughtful inclusive implementation plan will have a positive impact on the sustainability 
of the program. Seeking out the opposition early in the process will allow an immediate 
effort to address the concerns. 
It is also critical to address the causes leading to the decrease in the SLCFD 
involvement post-2002 Olympics. Although leadership in the SLCFD has changed, the 
249 Department of Homeland Security. (2014). 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. 
Washington, DC: The Department of Homeland Security. 
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complete lack of trust previous administrations had in the program cannot be overlooked. 
Demonstrating added value to the Department, City and the citizens served will be a 
challenge overcome by leveraging nationally recognized agency support and case study 
documentation from both fire- and law enforcement-centric models.  
Having identified trust as the cornerstone to success in the development, 
implementation and sustainment of the Fire intelligence program model within Salt Lake 
City, it will be important to assure that all necessary steps are taken to promote inclusion, 
ownership and added value to all parties within the network. Parties driving the effort 
must recognize their responsibility, as the trustees within the trust framework, to 
demonstrate ability, benevolence and integrity throughout the process. Presenting 
compelling evidence supporting the effort will be key to minimizing the perceived risk of 
the endeavor with other essential parties that may not necessarily be drivers of the 
development. 
The true take-away of this research is the recognition of our humanity and those 
we interact with throughout our lives. Trust flourishes where equality, value and 
inclusiveness are primary considerations. An environment that fosters safety in dialogue 





LIST OF REFERENCES 
9/11 Commission. The 9/11 Commission Report. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2004. 
American Civil Liberties Union. “More About Fusion Centers.” ACLU.org. 2013. 
http://www.aclu.org/spy-files/more-about-fusion-centers (accessed July 10, 2013). 
Andrus, Dan. Interview by Martha Ellis. Fire Marshal, 1998–2003 (August 25, 2014). 
The Arbinger Institute. “Arbinger History.” 2014. http://arbinger.com/history/ (accessed 
August 23, 2014). 
———. Leadership and Self Deception. San Francisco: Berett-Koehler Publishers, 2010. 
———. The Anatomy of Peace; Resolving the Heart of Conflict. San Francisco: Berrett-
Koehler Publishers, 2006. 
Axelrod, Robert. The Evolution of Cooperation. Cambridge: Perseus Books Group, 1984. 
Baker, Abdul Haqq. Counter-Terrorism: Community-Based Approaches to Preventing 
Terror Crime. Edited by Basia Spalek. Vol. Chapter 4. Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 
Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. 
Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner. 
Bates, Michael. “Fusion Centers Don’t Help Counterterrorism, Senate Report Says.” 
Batesline Tulsa Straight Ahead. 2012 2-October. http://www.batesline.com/
archives/2012/10/fusion-centers-dont-help-counter.html#comments (accessed 
July 10, 2013). 
Becker, Jo. Interview by POV Public Broadcasting System. Child’s Rights Advocacy 
Director, Human Rights Watch, 2005. http://www.pbs.org/pov/nomoretears/
special_hrw.php#.UeeQWOIInrE.email. 
Behunin, Scott A. Homeland Security Advisory System. Master’s thesis, Center for 
Homeland Defense and Security, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004. 
Bellavita, Chris. “Changing Homeland Security: A Strategic Logic of Special Event 
Security.” Homeland Security Affairs. 2007 September. 
http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=3.3.1 (accessed August 23, 2014). 
Bertram, Christopher. Factors the effect interagency collaborations: lessons during and 
following the 2002 Winter Olympics. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008. 
 101 
Bewig, Matt. NSA Violated U.S. Privacy Laws at Least 2,776 Times…In One Year. 
August 19, 2013. http://www.allgov.com/news/top-stories/nsa-violated-us-
privacy-laws-at-least-2776-timesin-one-year-130819?news=850897 (accessed 
August 19, 2013). 
Bhattacharji, Preeti. Council on Foreign Relations. May 20, 2009. http://www.cfr.org/
terrorist-organizations/liberation-tigers-tamil-eelam-aka-tamil-tigers-sri-lanka-
separatists/p9242 (accessed June 18, 2013). 
Bondarchuk, Katerina. “Hear Us Out: Radical Activism or “Eco-Terrorism” in Canada.” 
Academia.edu. 2011 April. http://www.academia.edu/
6415201/_Hear_Us_Out_Radical_Activism_or_Eco-Terrorism_in_Canada 
(accessed August 20, 2014). 
Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith. The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad 
Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics. New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2011. 
Burnette, Lisa. Interview by M. Ellis. SLC 911 Dispatch Senior Supervisor (October 14, 
2013). 
Burt, Ronald S. “Structurla Holes versus Network Closure as Social Captial.” 
Chicagobooth. 2001. Http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/ronald.burt/research/files/
SHNC.pdf (accessed July 10, 2013). 
Carr, Major Jeff. Interview by Martha Ellis. State Deputy Homeland Security Advisor 
(July 9, 2013). 
Carter, Chelsea J. & Yellin, Jessica. “CNN Read More.” Aug 10, 2013. 
http://www.wtae.com/news/politics/obama-wants-you-to-feel-better-about-
surveillance/-/9680976/21401140/-/3a5dw2z/-/index.html#ixzz2cTC2a8fJ . 
Caudle, Sharon. “Basic Practices Aiding High-Performance Homeland Security Regional 
Partnerships.” Homeland Security Affairs2, no. 3 (October 2006). 
Collins, Jim. Good To Great. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2001. 
Colonelli, Captain Nick. Interview by Martha Ellis. TLO Coordinator, Orange County 
Intelligence Assessment Center (July 15, 2014). 
Colonelli, Captain Nick. Interview by Martha Ellis. TLO Coordinator, Orange County 
Intelligence Assessment Center (July 16, 2013). 
Counter Terror Business. Counterterrorbusiness.com. 
http://www.counterterrorbusiness.com/index.php/features/74-counter-terrorism-
strategy/752-protecting-crowded-places (accessed March 9, 2014). 
 102 
Covey, Stephen R. The Speed of Trust, The One Thing That Changes Everything. New 
York: Free Press, 2006. 
Currao, Thomas. “A New Role for Emergency Management fostering trust to enhance 
collaboration in complex adaptive emergency response systems.” Calhoun 
Library. 2009 December. http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/handle/10945/4460 
(accessed September 28, 2013). 
Dabruzzi, Kyle and Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Firefighters’ Developing Role in 
Counterterrorism,” Policing Terrorism Report no. 3. New York, NY: Center for 
Policing Terrorism at the Manhattan Institute, August 2008. 
Department of Homeland Security. Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. 2013. 
http://www.fletc.gov/about-fletc/ (accessed July 11, 2013). 
Department of Homeland Security. 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. 
Government, Washington, DC: The Department of Homeland Security, 2014. 
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice. Fire Service 
Integration for Fusion Centers. Washington, DC: DHS & DOJ, 2012. 
Department of Homeland Security. National Emergency Communications Plan. Comm 
Plan, Homeland Security, U.S. Federal Government, Washington, DC: DHS, 
2008. 
———. See Something, Say Something. 2013. http://www.dhs.gov/if-you-see-something-
say-something-campaign (accessed July 9, 2013). 
———. State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers. 2013. http://www.dhs.gov/state-
and-major-urban-area-fusion-centers (accessed 2013 7-July). 
Deseve, Edward G. “Governing, The States and Localities.” Governing.com. December 
21, 2011. http://www.governing.com/columns/mgmt-insights/public-trust-
government-six-factors-change-perception.html (accessed September 29, 2013). 
Eilperin, Juliet. “The Washington Post Health and Science.” Washington Post. March 10, 
2012. http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/as-eco-terrorism-
wanes-governments-still-target-activist-groups-seen-as-threat/2012/02/28/
gIQAA4Ay3R_story.html (accessed August 20, 2014). 
Environmental Protection Agency. “Cameo.” EPA.Gov. 2014. http://www2.epa.gov/
epcra/local-emergency-planning-committees (accessed 2014 Aug). 
———. “Tier II Inventory Form.” EPA.Gov. June 27, 2014. http://www2.epa.gov/epcra/
local-emergency-planning-committees (accessed August 23, 2014 ). 
FDNY. FDNY Counter Terrorism and Risk Management Strategy. NY: FDNY, 2011. 
 103 
FEMA. National Incident Management System. Washington, DC: FEMA, 2008. 
Firescope California. Incident Command System for Fire Department Structure Fire 
Operations. Riverside, CA: OES Firescope OCC, 1994. 
Flynn, Jennifer D. Fire Service Perfomance Measures. Statistical, Fire Analysis and 
REsearch Division, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy: NFPA, 2009, 8. 
German, Mike. “National Security, Washington Post.” Washington Post. September16, 
2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/aclu-calls-on-
obama-congress-to-rein-in-power-of-the-fbi/2013/09/16/64481b6e-1bf1-11e3-
8685-5021e0c41964_story.html (accessed September16, 2013). 
Government Accountability Office. Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain 
Collaboration Among Federal Agencies. Government, Government 
Accountability Office, Washington, DC: United States Government, 2005. 
Gust-Jensen, Cindy. Interview by Martha Ellis. Executive Director, Salt Lake City 
Council (July 10, 2013). 
Heifetz, Ronald A, and Lindsky Marty. Leadership on the Line. Boston: Harvard 
Business Review Press, 2002. 
Heirston, Bryan. “Firefighters and Information Sharing: Smart Practice or Bad Idea?” 
Homeland Security Affairs 6, no. 2 (May 2010). 
———. Terrorism Prevention and Firefighting: Where are the information-sharing 
boundaries. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey: Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2009. 
Her Majesty’s Government. CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering 
Terrorism, Annual Report. Annual, London: Crown, 2013. 
Hocevar, Susan Page, Erik Jansen, and Gail Fann Thomas. “Inter-Organizational 
Collaboration: Addressing the Challenge.” Homeland Security Affairs 7, 
(September 2011). 
Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. 
———. Inside Terrorism, Revised and Expaned Edition. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2006. 
International Association of Fire Chiefs. “IAFC Terrorism and Homelands Security 
Committee.” International Association of Fire Chiefs. 2012. http://www.iafc.org/
committees/content.cfm?itemnumber=4648&navitemnumber=4439 (accessed 
June 26, 2013). 
 104 
Iowa State Fire Marshal’s Office. History of Fire and Fire Codes PDF. 
www.dps.state.ia.us (accessed June 22, 2013). 
Jensen, Derek. “Oly Security Effort ‘Model for Nation.’” Deseret News, 2002 9-March. 
Kiefner & Associates, Inc. Final Report on Leak Detection Study - DTPH56-11-D-
000001. Leak Study, Delivered to the U.S. Department of Transportaiontion 
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Worthington: Kiefner & 
Associates, 2012. 
Kinnvall, Catarina. “Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identy, and the 
Search for Ontological Security.” Political Psychology, 2004 October: 741–767. 
KSL News Agency. KSL.com. Feb 13, 2007. http://www.ksl.com/?nid=148&sid=888784 
(accessed July 8, 2013). 
———. KSL.com. April 15, 1999. http://web.ksl.com/dump/news/cc/b-ldshot.htm 
(accessed July 8, 2013). 
Landauer, Jeff, and Joseph Rowlands. “Importance of Philosophy, Ethics_Benevolence.” 
Importance of Philosophy. 2001. http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/
Ethics_Benevolence.html (accessed Aug 20, 2014). 
———. “Importance of Philosophy, The Trader Principle.” Importance of Philosophy. 
2001. http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Ethics_TraderPrincliple.html 
(accessed August 23, 2014). 
Lawrenson-Smith LLC. Fire Fighters counter Terrorims Awareness Course. Syllabus, 
Lawerson-Smith LLC, 2013. 
Lichtblau, Eric. The New Yor Times. 2013 6-july. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/
us/in-secret-court-vastly-broadens-powers-of-nsa.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
(accessed Aug 18, 2013). 
The Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age. Nation 
At Risk: Policy Makers Need Better Information to Protect the Country . Security, 
The Markle Foundation, New York: The Markle Foundation, 2009. 
———. Privacy and Civil Liberties. Brief, New York: Markle Foundation, 2009. 
Mayer, Roger C. James H. Davis, and f. David Schoorman. “An Integrative Model of 
Organizational Trust.” The Academy of Management Review (Academy of 
Management) 20, no. 3 (July 1995): 711. 
Merton, Robert K. “The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action.” 
American Sociological Review (American Sociological Association), 1936: pp 
894–904. 
 105 
Messner, Thomas M. “The Heritage Foundation research reports.” Heritage.Org. October 
22, 2009. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/10/the-price-of-prop-8 
(accessed August 23, 2014). 
Miller, Les. “Principles for Moving Toward Interoperability.” Supplemental Resources 
29. 
Moore, Mark H. “Public Value as the Focus of Strategy.” Australian Journal of Public 
Administration 53, no. 3 (1994): 297. 
Moyer, Jennifer. Trust and PR Practice. January 14, 2011. http://www.instituteforpr.org/
trust-and-pr-practice/ (accessed June 26, 2014). 
Mueller, John, and Mark G. Stewart. “Terror, Security and Money:Balancing the Risks, 
Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security.” Annual Convention of the Midwst 
Poitical Schience Association, 2011. 
National Counter Terrorism Security Office. NaCTSO.Gov. 2014. http://nactso.gov.uk/ 
(accessed 2014 3-March). 
———. NaTSO. 2024. http://www.nactso.gov.uk/our-services (accessed March 9, 2014). 
National Fire Protection Association. National Fire Protection Association. 2012. 
http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=955&itemID=23688&cookie 
_test=1 (accessed June 22, 2013). 
Nationwide SAR Initiative. National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center. 2012. 
http://nsi.ncirc.gov/training_online.aspx (accessed Uly 9, 2013). 
Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Security and Defense. FDNY and 
CHDS: More than a Decade of Homeland Security Education Partnership. 
Statistical, Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey: CHDS, 2014. 
Neubert, Michele, Alastair Jamieson, and Sarah Burke. “NBC News Storyline, Iraq 
Turmoil.” NBC News. June 29, 2014. www.nbcnews.com/storyline/iraq-turmoil/
rise-isis-heightens-threat-terrorism-west-experts-warn-n141661. 
O’Donoghue, Amy Joi, and Josh Smith. “Deseret News Utah Page.” Deseret News. June 
12, 2010. http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700039797/Oil-spill-in-Red-Butte-
Creek-threatens-waters-wildlife.html?pg=all (accessed August 20, 2014). 
Office of the President of the United States. National Security Strategy. Strategy, 
Washington, DC: The White House, 2010. 
 106 
Ogata, Wendy. KSL.com. February 13, 2007. http://www.deseretnews.com/article/
660195182/Infamous-shooting-incidents-in-Salt-Lake-County.html?pg=all 
(accessed July 8, 2013). 
Orange County Sheriff’s Department. Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center. 
2013. http://ocsd.org/divisions/fieldops/security/iac (accessed June 25, 2013). 
Patterson, Kerry, Joseph Grenny, Ron McMillan, and Al Switzler. Crucial 
Conversations; Tools for Talking When Stakes are High. New York: McGraw-
Hill, 2002. 
Pedahzur, Ami. Suicide Terrorism. Cambridge: Ami Pedahzur, 20078. 
Penty, Rebecca & Lee, Mike. Keystone “XL Pipeline Shuns High-Tech Oil Spill 
Detectors.” June 18, 2013. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-17/
keystone-xl-pipeline-shuns-high-tech-oil-spill-detectors.html. 
Pfeifer, Assistant Chief Joseph W. interview by Martha Ellis. FDNY (2014, 27-August). 
Pfeifer, Joseph. “Fire as a Weapon in Terrorist Attacks.” Combating Terrorism Center. 
West Point. July 23, 2013. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/fire-as-a-weapon-in-
terrorist-attacks (accessed 2014 2-August). 
———. “Network Fusion: Information and Intelligence Sharing for a Networked 
World.” HSAJ.ORG. HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS. 2012 October. 
http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=8.1.17 (accessed 2013, 8-July). 
Police Executive Research Forum. The Police Response to Active Shooter Incidents: 
Critical Issues in Policing Series. Research, Washington, DC: Police Executive 
Research Forum, 2014, 22. 
Pratt, Franklin D. Paul E. Pepe, Steven Katz, and David Persse. “Prehospital 9-1-1 
Emergency Medical Response: The rold of the United States Fire Serice in 
Delivery and Coordination.” www.iaff.org. International Association of Fire 
Fighters. 2007 July. https://www.iaff.org/tech/PDF/
FB%20EMS%20Whitepaper%20FINAL%20July%205%202007%20.pdf.  
Putnam, Robert D. Making Democracy Work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1993. 
Reavy, Pat. “KSL.Com Home.” KSL.com. July 1, 2013. 
http://www.ksl.com/?sid=25826529. 




Reinhard Kauffmann. “Letter of acceptance to the Olympic JTTF.” Letter from the office 
of the Chief. SLC: SLCFire Department, April 21, 2000. 
Rice, Lewis. “Raising the Alarm.” Harvard Kennedy School Magazine, 2010. 
Rollins, John and Connors, Timothy. State Fusion Center Processes and Procedures: 
Best Practices and Recommendations. Policy, The Manhattan Institutd, New 
York: The Manhattan Institute, 2007. 
Rotter, J. B. “A new Scale for the Mearsuement of Interpersonal Trust.” Journal of 
Personality 35 (1967): 651. 
Rudolph, Thomas J & Evans, Jillian. “Politcal Trust, Ideology, and Public Support for 
Government Spending.” American Journal of Political Science 49, no. 3 (July 
2005): 660. 
Salt Lake City. Fire Data-Management (FDM). Records Management, SLC: Salt Lake 
City Fire Department, 2013. 
Salt Lake City Fire Department. Salt Lake City Fire Department Annual Report 2012. 
Statistical, SLC: Salt Lake City Fire Department, 2012. 
Salt Lake City Fire Prevention Bureau. SLCFPB.com. 2013. http://www.slcfpb.com/go/
doc/3687/1334907/ (accessed July 9, 2013). 
Salt Lake City LEPC. Salt Lake City Local Emergency Planning Committee. 2013. 
http://www.slclepc.com/go/doc/3687/1608399/? (accessed July 9, 2013). 
Salt Lake County. Salt Lake County. 2013. http://www.slco.org/bydepartments/
yourcounty/govWithinSLCo.html (accessed July 10, 2013). 
Salt Lake Valley Training Alliance. Salt Lake Valley Training Alliance. 2013. 
http://saltlakevalleyfirealliance.wordpress.com/about/ (accessed July 10, 2013). 
Schelling, Thomas. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: President and Fellows of 
Harvard College, 1960. 
Schierow, Linda-Jo. The Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act 
(EPCRA): A Summary. Congressional Summary, Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 2012. 
Schwendiman, David. “2002 Winter Olympic Games, Utah Olympic Public Safety 
Command.” Olympic Intelligence Center Operational Plan. SLC: David 
Schwediman, 2002 8-February. 
———. “Utah Olympic Public Safety Command.” An Introduction to Olympic 
Intelligence. SLC: David Schwendiman, March 7, 2001. 
 108 
Seelig, Jennifer. Interview by Martha Ellis. Utah State Represetative, Democratic 
Minority Leader, Dist 23 (July 13, 2012). 
Seto, Laura P. Eng. Ross, Tim P. Eng. Development of a Long Duration, Free Swimming, 
Inline Acoustic Leak Detection Inspection Tool. Pipeline Integrity 
Department, Enbridge Pipelines Inc., Calgary: Enbridge Pipleines, 2013. 
Shropshire Fire and Rescue Service. Shrophire Fire Operational Intelligence. March 7, 
2014. https://www.shropshirefire.gov.uk/the-emergency-service/operational-
intelligence,  
SLC Fire Prevention Bureau. FDM Records Management System. Hazdous Materials 
Permiting Records, Salt Lake: Salt Lake City Fire Department, 2013. 
Smith, Paul. CHDS Moodle Learning Platform. January 28, 2014. https://www.chds.us/
coursefiles/comp/lectures/comp_CT_in_the_UK_mod02_ss/player.html (accessed 
February 20, 2014). 
Smith, Paul. Interview by Presentation CHDS. Counter Terrorism Contingency Planning 
(2014 January). 
Smith, Paul. Interview by CHDS Presentation. Counter Terrorism in the UK (2013 
Spring). 
Southern Poverty Law Center. SPLC Souther Poverty Law Center. 2002 Fall. 
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2002/
fall/from-push-to-shove/eco-violence-the-rec. 
Stafford, James. Breitbart. Feb 16, 2013. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/
2013/02/16/Could-a-New-Technology-Developed-for-Space-End-the-Pipeline-
Debate (accessed August 17, 2013). 
Statewide Information and Analysis Center (SIAC). Utah Department of Public Safety. 
2013. http://publicsafety.utah.gov/investigations/siac.html (accessed July 9, 
2013). 
Stindberg, Anders. “Social Indentity Theory and the Study of Terroism” (Draft). 2013. 
Tenner, Edward. “Unintended Consequences.” 2011, March. http://www.ted.com/talks/
edward_tenner_unintended_consequences.html (accessed June 10, 2013). 
Timmons, Ronald P. “Interoperability: Stop Blaming the Radio.” Homeland Security 
Affairs, Volume III, no. 1: (Feb 2007). 
Timmons, Ronald P. Radio Interoperability: Addressing the Real Reasons We Don’t 
Communicate Well During Emergencies. Thesis, Monterey: CHDS, 2006. 
109 
Trevor Tallon, Val Thometz, Scott Basket, Jeff Clark. Interview by M Ellis. COM-S 
Communication Specialist (October 10, 2013). 
Tuohy, Amy Danahue and Robert. “Lessons We Don’t Learn: A Study of the Lessons of 
Disasters, Why We Repeat them and How We Can Learn Them.” Homeland 
Security Affairs (Naval Postgraduate School) II, no. 2 (July 2006). 
U.S. Census Bureau. “State and Local Quick Facts.” July 8, 2014. quickfacts.census.gov/
qfd/states/49/49035.html (accessed July 11, 2014). 
U.S. Department of Transportation. U.S. Department of Transportation. July 31, 2013. 
http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/reports/safety/
AllPSI.html?nocache=5677#_liquid (accessed August 17, 2013). 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Local Emergency Planning Committees. July 25, 
2014. http://www2.epa.gov/epcra/local-emergency-planning-committees 
(accessed August 23, 2014). 
Utah Department of Natural Resources. Utah Oil and Gas. 2013. 
http://oilgas.ogm.utah.gov/index.htm (accessed July 10, 2013). 
Utah Olympic Public Safety Command. Utah Olympic Public Safety Command After 
Action Report. AAR, SLC: UOPSC, 2002. 
Vainuku, Roxeanne. KUTV.com. June 18, 2013. http://www.kutv.com/news/top-stories/
stories/vid_5368.shtml (accessed July 9, 2013). 
Vandongen, Cristal. Interview by Martha Ellis. Fire Investigator/Deputy Director, Fire 
and EMS Branch of UOPSC/Team Leader, Criminal Intelligence Collection and 
Dissemination Unit (August 24, 2014). 
Vuyk, John. Interview by Martha Ellis. Financial Manager, SLCFD (2013 8-July). 
Wallenchinsky, David. AllGov. August 19, 2013. http://www.allgov.com/news/top-
stories/nsa-violated-us-privacy-laws-at-least-2776-timesin-one-year-
130819?news=850897 (accessed August 22, 2013). 
Wasserman, Robert. Guidance for Building Communities of Trust. Guideline, Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Departmen of Justice, Washington, 
DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2010. 
Welch, Alicia L. “Terrorism awareness and Education as A Prevention Stratety for First 
Responders.” Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006. 
Whitehurst, Lindsay. ABC News. August 13, 2014. http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/
probation-suspect-utah-mall-shooting-plot-24968409 (accessed August 20, 2014). 
Winder, Jim. Interview by Martha Ellis, Sheriff, Salt Lake County (May 14, 2014). 
110 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
 111 
